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I. Executive Summary 
 and Recommendations
Police in Nigeria commit extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, and extortion with relative 
impunity. Nigeria Police Force (NPF) personnel routinely carry out summary execu-
tions of persons accused or suspected of crime; rely on torture as a principal means of 
investigation; commit rape of both sexes, with a particular focus on sex workers; and 
engage in extortion at nearly every opportunity. Nigeria’s government has previously 
acknowledged these problems and promised to address them. But as this report dem-
onstrates, the government has allowed the abuse to continue, and there is virtually no 
accountability for it.
Nigeria’s police force is over-centralized, under-resourced and ill-equipped, and 
suffers from political interference. The NPF’s recruitment process has been compro-
mised, leaving the police with a poorly trained, badly paid workforce that is prone to 
corruption and violence. Unable or unwilling to ensure public safety, many officers have 
turned to crime. Neither the NPF nor the government body designated to oversee it, the 
Police Service Commission (PSC), has established effective accountability measures to 
sanction and deter police misconduct. Abuse of the public, rather than service to it, has 
become a hallmark of policing in Nigeria. 
In his inaugural address on May 29, 2007, Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua 
promised: “Our government is determined to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement 
agencies, especially the police. The state must fulfill its constitutional responsibility of 
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protecting life and property.” Yet six months later, Acting Inspector-General of Police 
Mike Okiro, appointed by Yar’Adua, proudly reported that during his first 100 days in 
office the NPF had killed 785 people. One detainee in Lagos reported that during his 
seven days in police custody in 2006, NPF personnel killed 15 people in the station 
where he was being held. The victims of such extrajudicial executions are often disposed 
of surreptitiously, sometimes in local waterways or mass unmarked graves. In one 
well-documented case in 2004 in Kaduna State, the police visited a cemetery late at 
night to bury truckloads of detainees they had executed. The police frequently deny 
victims’ families access to information about their fate—or their remains. Relatives who 
continue to pursue such information, or seek redress, often face threats or reprisals 
from the police. 
Lacking the capacity to conduct proper criminal investigations, the NPF relies 
instead on torture to elicit “confessions.” This practice is so common that many police 
stations have a person on staff who oversees the torture of detainees and a room set 
aside for the practice; NPF personnel even have their own slang for various methods 
of torture. The police use many forms of brutality, including sexual violence against 
detainees and suspects.1 Some former detainees report having been bound and sus-
pended midair in painful positions and kicked and beaten with machetes, gun butts, 
boots, fists, electrical wires, animal hides, and other instruments. Others describe being 
shot in the leg or assaulted by police officers while in custody and suffering multiple 
fractures; being forced to perform impossibly painful calisthenics; and being raped. Sex 
workers report being rounded-up by NPF personnel for the express purpose of rape. 
Acknowledging the routine nature of rape by police, one police officer referred to it 
simply as a “fringe benefit” of certain patrols.2 
 Police personnel supplement their pay by extorting money from members of 
the public at roadblocks and on public highways. In some instances, what begins as a 
routine case of roadside extortion by the police extends to unjustified detention, then 
the infliction of torture, and ends in extrajudicial execution.
Low ranking officers do not typically act alone or on their own accord in perpe-
trating abuses. More senior police acquiesce to or even order the commission of these 
crimes. When injured victims or their families seek accountability, police management 
routinely subverts such efforts by transferring the responsible officers to other parts 
of the country; overseeing officers’ destruction of evidence, including the bodies of 
victims of extrajudicial killing; and tolerating the intimidation and violence frequently 
directed at complainants or witnesses. The result is not only impunity for the officers, 
but diminished public confidence in and respect for the police and the law. 
Reversing this situation and improving policing in Nigeria pose severe challenges. 
Many significant changes must be made, both within the force and outside it, to rectify 
the NPF’s performance. Based on the NPF’s dismal failure to police its own ranks, it 
is clear that the police require greater oversight and should not have a monopoly on 
investigating and sanctioning their own misconduct. While the greatest changes will 
have to come from the police themselves, they cannot be expected to act alone. Many 
institutions will have to play a more central and determined role in ensuring that the 
NPF is both respectful of rights and effective at law enforcement. 
The recommendations called for below are ambitious and far-reaching, but must 
be enacted in order to bring accountability and competence to the NPF and reduce the 
crimes committed by its members.
1.  Increase the Autonomy of the Nigeria Police Force
To be more accountable and responsive to the people it serves, the NPF must have 
greater autonomy from political control, coupled with greater internal control and exter-
nal oversight. This cannot be achieved if the NPF answers only to the president. 
The federal government should:
• Seek a constitutional amendment to create an independent NPF led by an 
inspector-general of police (IGP) who has operational control of the entire force. 
The IGP should be nominated by the president and confirmed by the senate.
• Continue the budgetary reforms begun in 2008 by making each area command 
into a distinct budgetary unit, thereby increasing local accountability and reduc-
ing reliance on federal-level funding. 
The NPF should:
• Publish annually and submit to the National Assembly information on the sources 
and amount of all discretionary funds and donations received outside of official 
budgetary appropriations. 
2.  Increase External Oversight of the Nigeria Police 
  Force
The NPF’s myriad failings—to prevent crime, to solve crime, to punish police person-
nel who engage in crime—are either enabled or exacerbated by the absence of external 
oversight. In theory, the PSC and the National Human Rights Commission have the 
power to oversee the NPF and investigate crime committed by its members. But in 
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reality, as this report documents, these bodies are almost wholly ineffective. New 
policies and procedures are needed to ensure the NPF’s accountability. 
The federal government should: 
• Create a dedicated federal prosecutorial unit to pursue felonies committed by 
active duty police officers. This unit should have investigative capacity separate 
from the NPF. It should be endowed with the power to investigate and prosecute 
any acts of misconduct and/or criminal acts by NPF personnel. 
• Develop a “duty solicitors” scheme that would place young lawyers completing 
their national service in police stations, to provide representation to detainees as 
they enter the criminal justice system. This may be complemented by duly accred-
ited university-based legal assistance clinics or Bar-sponsored pro bono initiatives.
• Direct the National Human Rights Commission to monitor cases involving 
police abuses and report regularly on these to both the National Assembly and 
the federal attorney-general. 
• Instruct the directors of all federally funded medical centers to file with their 
state’s Ministry of Justice monthly registers of all bodies deposited by the police, 
including the name of the depositing police officer, his or her force number, and 
a copy of the autopsy report. 
• Establish a confidential mechanism—independent of the police—for victims, 
their families, medical personnel, and other witnesses to report evidence of rape 
or sexual abuse by police, and receive appropriate medical and psychological 
treatment. 
The National Assembly should: 
• Mandate a formal right of access to prisons, police holding centers, and any other 
places of detention used by the NPF. This right of access should be granted to the 
National Human Rights Commission, which can train and accredit lay representa-
tives to make fact-finding visits to places of detention. 
• Require the inspector general of police to file a semi-annual report regarding NPF 
detention policies and practices, including information organized by district on 
the number and average duration of all detentions, and the number and type of 
civilian complaints filed against NPF personnel. 
The Police Service Commission should: 
• Exercise its statutory authority to audit, oversee, and investigate the activities 
of the NPF. In particular, the PSC should oversee the NPF’s investigation and 
adjudication of any civilian complaints concerning serious crimes committed by 
police, including all accusations related to extrajudicial killing, firearms discharge, 
rape, torture, and civilian deaths in police custody.3
• Exercise its statutory powers to gain access to all internal police investigations, 
including participating in internal police interviews of all witnesses, and/or sus-
pects; proposing lines of investigation and specific investigative tasks; and iden-
tifying broad issues for review. 
• Conduct its own investigations into police misconduct, particularly in cases where 
the police response is inadequate or there is reason to suspect a police cover up.
The National Human Rights Commission should: 
• Expedite its investigations of human rights violations alleged against the NPF. Of 
the 254 complaints of extrajudicial executions lodged with the commission since 
1997, only five have advanced beyond the first stage of review.
3.  Increase Internal Control of the Nigeria Police 
  Force
To repair its reputation and prevent future crimes by its personnel, the NPF must 
establish internal accountability mechanisms that deter police misconduct and ensure 
a thorough investigation into allegations of misconduct. 
The NPF should: 
• Establish a system for receiving and processing civilian complaints about police 
misconduct or crime. This system must provide confidential means for reporting 
police misconduct and guarantee the safety of victims and witnesses.
• Maintain an effective internal affairs unit that can investigate specific complaints, 
seek out police misconduct, and use data to identify patterns of misconduct and 
problem officers.
• Establish and maintain a publicly accessible national register of all deaths in NPF 
custody or as a result of contact with NPF personnel. 
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• Establish a system to record and track all detainees from the point of arrest until 
their case is adjudicated.
• Prohibit the transfer to another jurisdiction of any officer who is the subject of a 
pending civilian complaint. 
• Promulgate and rigorously enforce rules governing the maintenance of files and 
related evidence. 
4.  Improve Recruitment and Other Personnel
  Practices
In its drive to increase the size of the force, the NPF has virtually abandoned its recruit-
ing standards, with disastrous results. A presidential committees in 2008 concluded 
that the NPF “grossly compromised standards and resulted in widespread abuse of 
established procedure”4 and became saddled with “a very large number of unqualified, 
under-trained and ill-equipped officers—in sum an undesirable workforce.”5 
The NPF should: 
• Revise recruiting and vetting processes to ensure only persons with clean criminal 
records, adequate experience and/or preparation, and appropriate temperament 
are recruited as police officers. 
• Maintain records of all candidates who have been rejected by the NPF because 
of prior criminal conduct and those officers who have been disciplined by the 
NPF or criminally prosecuted. This will prevent unsuitable candidates from being 
hired and former officers from being rehired. 
• Promote connections between police and the people they serve by retaining offi-
cers in a particular community for several years. 
• Provide all NPF personnel with training in community policing techniques.
The federal government should: 
• Improve police-community relations and prevent police abuses by implementing 
a community policing strategy across the country. 
• Provide the NPF and PSC access to relevant court and prison records, for use in 
vetting applicants to the NPF.
5.  Improve Police Training and Tactics, Especially
  Regarding Use of Firearms and Force
This report focuses on police criminality and the thousands of Nigerians who are killed, 
tortured, and raped by NPF personnel every year. Yet many other Nigerians are injured 
or killed each year by police ineptitude: NPF personnel are too quick to draw their guns 
and too cavalier about firing them. At the same time, policing is dangerous work: the 
NPF acknowledges that at least 930 officers were killed in the line of duty between 2000 
and 2006.6 Clearly, better training is needed to improve the safety of both the civilian 
population and the officers themselves.
The NPF should: 
• Improve firearms training, including teaching defensive and preventive tactics. 
Better training in these areas has been shown to reduce the likelihood of police 
drawing their guns unnecessarily, while increasing officer safety. 
• Conduct a formal review of all NPF firearms discharges, regardless of whether 
anyone was hit. This review should be designed not only to determine whether 
wrongdoing occurred but to identify and then correct gaps in training, supervi-
sion, equipment, or policy which contributed to the shooting. 
The National Assembly should: 
• Require the NPF to publish a semi-annual report indicating the number, 
geographic and unit distribution, and outcomes (such as fatalities, injuries, and 
property damage) of all officer-involved firearms incidents, as well as the outcomes 
of the corresponding review and/or disciplinary or criminal proceedings. 
6.  Improve arrest and detention practices 
The NPF’s arrest and detention practices—and the absence of institutional control over 
them—are central to the pattern of abuse and impunity outlined in this report. Particu-
larly damaging is the “holding charge,” under which arrestees can be remanded into 
custody without even a minimal judicial investigation into the charges and without 
any opportunity to challenge the charges against them. Because no court is seized of 
the charges against such persons, the police have a nearly unfettered ability to detain 
them indefinitely; the average length of pretrial detention in Nigeria is three years and 
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10 months. The Nigerian Bar Association has identified the holding charge as a gateway 
to serious abuse.7
Courts, prosecutors, and the NPF should: 
• Ensure compliance with Nigeria’s ex isting legal requirement that suspects and 
detainees should, from the moment they are taken into police custody, be advised 
of their rights under Nigerian law, including the right to know the reasons for 
which they are being detained, the right to be interrogated in the presence of a 
legal representative, and the right to petition for bail. Family members, lawyers, 
and representatives from human rights organizations should be allowed access 
to information about detainees’ legal status and location, and have the right to 
interview them and/or inspect the detainee registry. 
The NPF should: 
• Ensure that police personnel are adequately trained to use appropriate investiga-
tive techniques, including forensics, as an alternative to the current over-reliance 
on arresting and interrogating suspects. 
• Maintain standardized and accurate records concerning arrests, detention, any 
injuries or deaths in custody, or firearms incidents for all police stations and 
detention facilities, without exception. These records should be submitted annu-
ally to both the National Assembly and the Police Service Commission and should 
thereafter be publicly accessible. 
• Review and substantially revise Force Order 237, which permits the use of deadly 
force against uncharged, unarmed persons suspected of involvement in relatively 
minor offenses. The order should be revised to comply with applicable national 
and international standards, including the United Nations’ Basic Principles on the 
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,8 the Body of Principles 
for the Protection of all Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,9 
and the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers.10
The National Assembly should: 
• Amend criminal procedure laws to eliminate the holding charge. Applicable laws 
should be changed to ensure that a magistrate reviews evidence before issuing a 
remand order, and that all individuals remanded are subject to the jurisdiction of 
a judicial officer. In addition, magistrates should be required to conduct periodic 
reviews of all remanded prisoners under their jurisdiction.
The National Assembly, in partnership with the government of Lagos State, should:
• Mandate and fund an independent study of the pilot project in Lagos State that 
requires interrogations to be recorded on audio and/or video tape. Depending on 
the cost and effectiveness of the pilot project, the practice of recording interroga-
tions should be extended throughout the country. 
7.  Improve Working Conditions for NPF Personnel
The compensation for NPF officers is so meager that they commonly live in extreme 
poverty. Housing and health benefits are generally lacking, leaving officers with little 
legitimate stake in the position or good reason to take the risks inherent in police work. 
Officers often turn to extortion to supplement their paltry salaries. 
Nigeria’s president and federal government should: 
• Review and improve the overall compensation provided to members of the police 
so it reflects the importance of the job and the high expectations invested in every 
member of the NPF.
• Establish pay levels that are tied, in part, to performance in reducing police abuses 
and addressing crime. 
• Secure adequate group life, health, and disability insurance coverage for employ-
ees.
• Employ social and taxation policy—such as lower taxes for police officers and free 
or subsidized access to public health and education for their children—to supple-
ment NPF salaries.
8.  Adopt Legislative Measures to Bring Nigeria into
  Alignment with International Hum an Rights Norms
Nigeria’s failure to ratify various international human rights treaties and incorporate 
them into domestic law makes it easier for police to commit rights abuses and harder 
for courts to prosecute them for doing so. In July 2009, Nigeria ratified the Optional 
Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment. The convention requires Nigeria to designate a national 
prevention mechanism with fully guaranteed independence and unhindered access to 
all places of detention.11 At the time of publication, there was no such body in Nigeria.
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The federal government should: 
• Ratify the First Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, accepting the right of individual petition to the Human Rights 
Committee under the Covenant.
State legislatures should: 
• Adopt legislation establishing torture as a crime under the criminal code. 
The National Assembly should: 
• Adopt legislation to incorporate into domestic law the provisions of the United 
Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment. In particular, it should formally define and sanction torture as a crime 
under domestic law, prescribe effective punishment for the crime, and establish 
effective legal remedies for victims of police abuse and torture. 
9.  Work with International Donors to Improve the
  NPF’s Performance
As the above recommendations make clear, the process of reforming the NPF will not 
be simple or easy. Resources from outside Nigeria will be required if the reform is to 
succeed. Nigeria’s international partners should focus their assistance on improving 
the NPF’s skills in investigation, community relations, and ensuring measurable reduc-
tion of police abuse. By focusing on the problems and suggested remedies enumerated 
in this report, Nigeria’s international partners can play an invaluable role in reducing 
police crime and improving effectiveness.
II. Introduction
This report documents a shocking pattern of crimes by personnel of the Nigeria Police 
Force (NPF). The pervasiveness of the abuse calls into question the legitimacy of the 
entire force. Moreover, the abuse is known to and officially acknowledged by the high-
est levels of both police and political leadership in Nigeria. As this report makes clear, 
many members of the NPF are more likely to commit crimes than to prevent them.
In 2008, a presidential commission on the NPF headed by former Inspector-
General of the Police Mohammed Dikko Yusuf concluded that policing in Nigeria was 
characterized by a pattern of “unlawful arrest and detention, extortion, torture, rape, 
extrajudicial killings and other forms of brutality. The negative image of the police 
in the eyes and minds of the public arose from the high level of crimes in the force 
and its failure to carry out genuine police functions successfully.”12 The commission 
lamented that “instead of becoming a public asset therefore, the police have become a 
public burden.”13
A former inspector-general of police, Ibrahim Coomasie, accuses the NPF of “bar-
baric treatment of Nigerians.”14 Supporting this description, many ex-detainees inter-
viewed for this report spoke of being tied up and suspended mid-air in painful positions 
while being beaten with machetes, gun butts, boots, fists, electrical wires, animal hides, 
and other instruments. Others described being shot in the leg or assaulted by police 
officers while in custody and suffering multiple fractures. Some female ex-detainees 
reported being sexually abused by police personnel, including being raped and having 
pepper spray used on their genitals. A police officer in Ikeja, Lagos State, described the 
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apparently common practice of raping sex workers, claiming that “this is one of the 
fringe benefits attached to night patrol.”15 Male ex-detainees interviewed for this report 
routinely described having sharp objects inserted into their genitals. 
In its Universal Period Review (UPR) report submitted to the United Nations 
Human Rights Council in January 2009, Nigeria’s federal government acknowledged 
“allegations of extrajudicial killings against members of the Nigerian security agencies, 
especially the police,” but claimed that it “neither sanctions, nor will it allow extraju-
dicial killings to be carried out with impunity in Nigeria.”16 When he presented and 
defended Nigeria’s UPR report in Geneva on February 9, 2009, Foreign Minister Ojo 
Maduekwe attributed to foreign nongovernmental organizations the allegation that NPF 
personnel “commit rape in many different circumstances” and dismissed it as “prepos-
terous.”17
But official government sources—as well as interviews conducted for this report—
belie Maduekwe’s denials. In April 2008, the report of the Presidential Committee on 
Police Reform (the second such committee to be formed in recent years; the first was 
in 2006) admitted the existence of institutionalized police abuse.18 Eight months later, 
in December 2008, a presidential commission on the reform of Nigeria’s electoral sys-
tem found the NPF guilty of a pattern of criminal conduct during elections in Nigeria, 
including “brutality, intimidation, facilitating the snatching and destruction of ballot 
boxes, under-age voting, mass thumb-printing of ballot papers, forgery of results in 
exchange for bribes, etc.”19
NPF personnel enjoy a stunning degree of impunity. The government routinely 
fails to exercise due diligence in investigating or ensuring accountability for police 
abuses. The police do not have effective or transparent mechanisms of internal control 
and discipline. External oversight is almost nonexistent. Senior government officials 
occasionally boast of how many “robbers” are killed by police. In Enugu State, the 
head of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) of the State Police Command boasted 
in December 2008 to a researcher from the Network on Police Reform in Nigeria 
(NOPRIN) that he ordered the extrajudicial executions of only those persons whom he 
knew to be guilty. He took offense at being asked to explain how—without investigation 
or trial—he could determine the guilt or innocence of such persons before putting them 
to death. In November 2007, Acting Inspector-General of Police Mike Okiro reported 
that the police had killed 785 “armed robbers” and arrested another 1,628 in his first 100 
days as acting inspector-general.20 One week later, President Umaru Yar’Adua removed 
the “acting” tag and confirmed Okiro as tenured IGP. 
In Nigeria, the Police Service Commission (PSC) has oversight of the police and 
is responsible for preventing and investigating police abuses. But the PSC is hobbled by 
inadequate resources, resistance from the police and political leadership, and an unwill-
ingness to challenge the status quo. Judicial oversight of the NPF is no more effective, 
because judges must rely on investigations conducted by the same NPF whose person-
nel are accused of committing abuse in the first place. Not surprisingly, these investiga-
tions rarely result in a conviction. With such weak oversight, few cases of police abuse 
are reported and fewer still are successfully prosecuted. Victims know that this oversight 
system is unlikely to provide effective redress and rightfully fear reprisals if they report 
police abuse. This systematic failure to stop police abuse or exercise appropriate over-
sight corrodes police-community relations, reinforces impunity, and makes the NPF, as 
an institution, even more likely to prey on the people it should be protecting.
The murder, torture, and other crimes described in this report are not the actions 
of a few rogue police officers, but rather examples of a culture of violence and lawless-
ness that pervades the whole force. The NPF often fails to keep adequate records of 
people in custody, fully knowing that this failure facilitates abuses against detainees 
and suspects. These abuses are often perpetrated either on the specific orders of supe-
rior police officers or with their knowledge or acquiescence, creating the impression of 
criminalized policing in Nigeria. 
As this report documents, NPF officers commit summary executions, participate 
in large-scale killings, and undertake the mass burials of victims in shallow graves 
(Chapter VI). The NPF routinely relies on torture as its principal means of investigation 
and maintains designated chambers, instruments, and personnel for this purpose in 
most police stations (Chapter VII). Rape and sexual violence against female detainees 
and suspects is not unusual (Chapter VIII), with police attempting to cause suffering, 
inflict punishment, or coerce compliance by subjugating the victims. Policing in Nigeria 
is also characterized by pervasive corruption, such as diverting police resources for per-
sonal protection or enrichment in a variety of police-for-hire arrangements; harassment 
and intimidation of victims; and the destruction of evidence, including the bodies of 
victims of extrajudicial executions. Officers routinely practice extortion on members of 
the public at roadblocks and on public highways (Chapter IX). 
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III. Objectives, Methodology, 
 and Scope
Public confidence is essential to effective policing. When police commit torture, mur-
der, and other crimes, they undermine the public confidence so central to guaranteeing 
public safety and security. A culture of criminal policing and pervasive corruption by 
police personnel promotes lawlessness and fosters an increased sense of insecurity. In 
its April 2008 report, Nigeria’s second Presidential Committee on Police Reform deter-
mined that arising from the pattern of violations associated with policing in Nigeria 
there was profound “loss of public confidence in the integrity of police personnel. The 
Police have become generally regarded by the public as corrupt, inept and inefficient.”21
This report is based on independent field monitoring and investigation at over 
400 police stations and posts in fourteen states and territories in Nigeria from February 
2007 to January 2009. This research was augmented by a review of relevant legisla-
tion, case law and official reports, as well as secondary materials, including newspaper 
articles and NGO reports. The states selected for field monitoring and investigation—
two from each of Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones—were:
• North-East: Borno and Adamawa States 
• North-West: Kaduna and Kano States
• North-Central: Federal Capital Territory of Abuja and Plateau State 
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• South-West: Lagos and Oyo States
• South-South: Delta and Rivers States
• South-East: Abia and Anambra States 
In addition, supplemental field monitoring took place in Enugu State in the 
South-East zone and Sokoto State in the North-West. Additional interviews and police 
station visits were undertaken subsequently in some of the states in the six months 
between September 2008 and February 2009. Monitoring work was undertaken by field 
researchers deployed by NOPRIN, a nonprofit, nonpartisan coalition of organizations 
working to promote institutional accountability for the NPF. 
NOPRIN monitors observed police behavior and conducted extensive interviews 
with over 5,000 persons, including frontline police officers, police supervisors, other 
government officials, and victims of police abuse or their surviving relatives. Interview-
ees included complainants, detainees, ex-detainees, suspects, and medical, legal, and 
judicial professionals, as well as providers of complementary services to the police, such 
as mortuary attendants. Interviews were deliberately unstructured and designed to elicit 
the experiences and opinions of the respondents. 
In the preparation of this report, effort has been made to protect the identities—
and hence the safety—of monitors and interviewees. It was necessary in some cases to 
accord anonymity to the interviewees or to identify them only by first name because of 
the well-founded fear of police reprisal. When interviewees provided specific accounts of 
police misconduct, monitors or field researchers conducted follow-up research to ensure 
the veracity of the accounts. The patterns and details of police abuse that emerged from 
the interviews and field investigations were consistent among interviewees in the differ-
ent geopolitical zones of Nigeria who could not have had any contact with one another. 
This concordance strongly suggests that these police practices are common across the 
country and that the interviewees were giving credible accounts.
In addition to firsthand monitoring, research for this report extended to a review 
of secondary literature, including media reports and reports by governmental, inter-
governmental, and nongovernmental organizations on police conduct in Nigeria pub-
lished in the past decade. Researchers supplemented the field investigation and review 
of secondary sources with three expert reviews of the patterns of police conduct towards 
women,22 medico-legal aspects of police conduct,23 and police forensics.24 Additionally, 
investigators reviewed all complaints of extrajudicial executions against NPF personnel 
and other internal security agencies lodged with the National Human Rights Com-
mission from 1997 to 2005.25 Finally, the preparation of this report was informed by a 
survey of accounts of police abuse published in seven leading Nigerian newspapers and 
three weekly magazines from 2006 to March 2008.26
C R I M I N A L  F O R C E   2 7
 The investigation that led to this report was initially designed to simply examine 
and document service delivery by NPF personnel. But by the midpoint of the monitoring 
period, field researchers had detected a clear and chilling pattern of police abuse. This 
finding compelled a shift in the investigation. As a result, the report’s researchers nar-
rowed their focus to investigating and reporting on the four most frequent complaints 
received during field monitoring: police killings, torture, rape and sexual violence, and 
extortion. The distinction between different categories of police abuse conforms partly 
to existing legal categories of offenses and also the need for clarity in presenting them. 
For victims, the distinctions between these four categories may be meaningless: what 
starts as a routine case of roadside extortion may lead to unjustified detention, torture, 
rape, and even extrajudicial execution.

IV. Backg round 
Nigeria is a federation comprising 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory. The cur-
rent constitution, adopted in 1999, establishes the NPF and prohibits the existence or 
establishment of state or local police.27 The NPF is a federal entity under control of the 
president. To understand today’s NPF, it is necessary to examine its history and struc-
ture, and the context in which it operates.
In 1860, British colonial authorities created a 30-member Consular Guard in 
Lagos as the first organized policing unit for the territory which eventually became 
Nigeria. Over the next 70 years, colonial authorities established constabularies and 
police formations in different parts of Nigeria.28 In 1914, the British colonial authori-
ties amalgamated the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria with the Colony 
of Lagos and created the territory currently known as Nigeria. This was followed by the 
creation of a unified NPF under the leadership of an inspector-general of police in 1930. 
Nigeria inherited the institutions and culture of the colonial police when it gained 
independence from Great Britain in 1960. Colonial authorities used the police prin-
cipally to control local communities and tamp down any challenges to colonialism.29 
Colonial police earned a reputation for the “brutal subjugation of communities and 
suppression of resistance to colonial rule.”30 The foundations of the NPF’s brutality 
were laid during the colonial era. 
Nigeria’s history of governmental and constitutional instability helps to explain 
the professional incapacities, institutional weaknesses, and criminal culture of the NPF. 
Since Nigeria gained independence in October 1960, the country has had 12 presidents 
or heads of government, eight of whom presided over a total of 29 years of military 
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rule. During this same period, the country saw six constitutions (including one that 
never entered into force),31 four constitution drafting processes, four programs of transi-
tion from military to civilian government,32 five successful and at least three unsuccessful 
coup attempts,33 three civilian regimes, two constituent assemblies, and one civil war.34 
Nigeria most recently returned to civilian government after 15 years of military rule under 
a constitution that entered into force on May 29, 1999. 
This history of post-independence instability and authoritarianism created a tra-
dition of unaccountable governments lacking popular legitimacy and cemented the 
culture of police brutality. Nigeria’s leaders alternately used the police to enforce their 
power and deliberately weakened the NPF to prevent its involvement in coups. Succes-
sive military regimes co-opted and enthusiastically used the police to sustain their dicta-
torships largely because the police alone had a nationwide security presence and license 
to use violence.35 Nigeria’s military rulers routinely appointed inspectors-general of the 
police to the highest decision-making bodies of military government—the Supreme 
Military Council or the Armed Forces Ruling Council. The military also appointed sev-
eral senior police officers as military governors, administrators of different states and 
territories, or federal-level ministers. 
To prevent coups, successive military regimes dismantled the communications 
infrastructure of the police, “failed to fund the Police adequately,”36 and, with the revi-
sion of the Police Act in 1967, centralized operational control of the police in the hands 
of the head of state. Together, these measures politicized the force, degraded its opera-
tional effectiveness, and diminished the NPF’s reputation as a professional institution. 
In 2008, the most recent Presidential Committee on Police Reform explained the full 
effect of military intervention and constitutional instability on the NPF as follows:
  Successive military regimes erroneously regarded the Nigeria Police as a rival power base (to 
the armed forces) and as such did everything they could to undermine its capabilities and 
effectiveness, so as to sustain their political hegemony. As a result, standards of training, dis-
cipline, kitting, etc. fell drastically as a result of deliberate under-funding and neglect. Worse 
still, through several interventions and subterfuge, the military deliberately created rival law 
and order institutions, and usurped police duties by setting up anti-crime taskforces and 
other outfits and effecting so many changes in the institutional organisation, appointment 
and deployment of the Nigeria Police, which further eroded public confidence in the Force. 
This trend went on throughout military rule, from 1966 to 1979, and from 1983 to 1999. 
The advent of democratic administration from 1999 did not change matters, because the 
former President came with the same military mindset. As such, the position of the Nigeria 
Police even deteriorated. The cumulative impact of all these has been a Nigeria Police Force 
that has been weakened, deficient, incapacitated, lacking in confidence and orientation.37
Civilian regimes have also used the police for partisan purposes, including 
electoral fraud and political violence. The NPF, under a succession of unaccountable 
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regimes, crystallized a tradition of “over-centralizing Police control in the hands of 
the President, who could use the Police for political purposes, including silencing all 
opposition voices. ... Often times, the Police have colluded with groups and taken sides 
depending on what benefits their political patrons.”38 In December 2008, the Presiden-
tial Committee on Electoral Reform, chaired by former Chief Justice of Nigeria Moham-
med Lawal Uwais, complained about the “functional ineffectiveness of the police during 
elections” and certified a litany of complaints of criminal conduct by the police during 
elections including “unprofessional conduct like brutality, intimidation, facilitating the 
snatching and destruction of ballot boxes, under-age voting, mass thumb-printing of 
ballot papers, forgery of results in exchange for bribes, etc.”39 
Through the authoritarianism of successive colonial and post-colonial military 
and civilian regimes, the NPF evolved into an instrument for regime protection firmly 
rooted in “a culture of violence.”40
The Political and Institutional Context of Policing in 
Nigeria
Policing in Nigeria takes place in a context of political instability, weak institutions, 
ethnic and religious diversity (and occasional strife), poverty, and poor infrastructure. 
With a population estimated at 140 million, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous nation—
and with an annual growth rate of 3.2 percent, one of its fastest growing.41 Estimated 
life expectancy is 46.8 years for men and 48.1 years for women. According to 2003 
estimates, the male adult literacy rate in Nigeria is about 75 percent while female adult 
literacy is about 60 percent. An estimated 87 percent of Nigerians are vulnerable to 
poverty, with 41.2 percent living in chronic poverty.42 Nigeria comprises about 389 eth-
nic and language groups43 and has a long history of inter-ethnic, sectarian, and political 
violence which affects the deployment of policing resources.44 
Not surprisingly, in this context of widespread poverty, yawning income dispar-
ity, and poor service delivery by the government, “there is a social class bias” to police 
abuses in Nigeria.45 Poor and socially disadvantaged people—including commercial 
transport operators, artisans, domestic workers, sex workers, and the unemployed—are 
most likely to be abused by police. In 2005, a presidential committee found that nearly 
three-quarters of suspects in pretrial custody did not have legal representation because 
they could not afford it.46 This supports the suggestion that those who suffer extrajudi-
cial execution or other severe abuse in police custody are mostly persons who are too 
poor to afford a bribe, bail, or a barrister.47
At the inauguration of the first Presidential Committee on Police Reform in Jan-
uary 2006, then Minister for Police Affairs Alaowei Broderick Bozimo pleaded that 
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the administration of then President Olusegun Obasanjo “inherited [in 1999] a Police 
Force that was poorly equipped, decimated in numerical strength, deprived of neces-
sary logistics, and lacking, as it were, moral and public support necessary for effective 
performance and the enhancement of the security of the nation.”48 President Obasanjo’s 
Federal Attorney-General and Justice Minister Kanu Agabi, a Senior Advocate of Nige-
ria, characterized the NPF as, “numerically weak … poorly paid and poorly trained.”49 
Professor Philip Alston, in his capacity as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (hereinafter “UN Special Rapporteur”), 
found the NPF to be “seriously under-resourced.”50 
It is difficult to determine the exact size of the NPF. When Nigeria returned to 
electoral politics in 1999, after 15 years of military rule, there were an estimated 137,000 
personnel in the NPF, representing a police-to-population ratio of approximately 
1:876.51 (By comparison, the police-to-population ratio in the United States is estimated 
at 1:400.)52 To address what he believed was a serious shortfall in police personnel, 
President Obasanjo issued a presidential directive to recruit 200,000 additional police 
personnel over five years from 2000 to 2004 at the rate of 40,000 recruits every year 
“even though all the training institutions (in the NPF) can only accommodate 14,000 
intake per annum.”53 By 2003, the police population was estimated to be 260,000.54 
In 2005, Human Rights Watch estimated on the basis of information provided by the 
NPF that Nigeria had 325,000 police personnel.55 In 2006, then Inspector-General of 
Police Sunday Ehindero claimed in an interview that the population of the NPF was 
“about 320,000.”56 As a result of the expedited recruitment ordered by Obasanjo, the 
NPF claimed in 2007 to have achieved a police-to-population ratio of approximately 
1:400, based on an estimated force strength of about 360,000 police officers.57 At the 
beginning of 2008, this number was reported to be 370,900.58 According to the 2008 
report of the Presidential Committee on Police Reform:
  The Nigeria Police currently has a total of three hundred and seventy-one thousand, eight 
hundred (371,800) personnel, comprising twenty-one thousand, nine hundred and five 
(21,905) senior officers, from the ranks of ASP [Assistant Superintendent of Police] II to the 
IGP, and three hundred and forty-nine thousand, eight hundred and ninety five (349,895) 
junior officers from constable to inspectors of police. This indicates a ratio of one officer to 
seventeen junior ranks (1:17). On the whole, the nation has a ratio of one policeman to three 
hundred and seventy seven persons (1:377), based on a total population of 140,002,542 (2006 
Census estimate).59
At the end of an 18-month audit of NPF personnel undertaken by the PSC, the 
chairperson of the PSC, Parry Osayande, announced that the NPF had a staff of 377,000 
police personnel as of January 2009.60
Two features of the internal demographics and distribution of the NPF are worth 
highlighting here. First, a significant portion of the NPF’s personnel are unavailable 
for general policing duties. An estimated 27 percent of police personnel are engaged 
in personal guard and protective duties,61 thereby creating a situation in which “the 
rich and powerful behave with impunity because of police protection.”62 There is clear 
evidence of a pattern policing resources being diverted for private purposes. 
Secondly, the expedited recruitment conducted under presidential orders between 
2000 and 2005 was “carried out in a very unwholesome manner without adherence to 
the established rules and guidelines governing the screening and recruitment of candi-
dates.”63 This led to an influx of “suspected criminals, people with physical deformities, 
doubtful background, over-aged and educationally unqualified barely literate entrants 
into the Police Force.”64 The resulting combination of compromised enlistment proce-
dures, grossly inadequate training and orientation regimes, and poor policing traditions 
“has grossly compromised standards and resulted in widespread abuse of established 
procedure” and “the enlistment of unsuitable candidates.”65 As a result, the NPF became 
saddled with “a very large number of unqualified, under-trained and ill-equipped offi-
cers and men, many of whose suitability to wear the respected uniform of the Force is 
in doubt.”66 In April 2008, the more recent Presidential Committee on Police Reform 
described the NPF as an “undesirable workforce.”67 
The NPF’s budget has risen steadily since 2000. But due to waste, corruption, and 
administrative bloat, this increase in resources has not improved police performance 
and service delivery. Most of the budget increase has been taken up by increased per-
sonnel costs as the NPF added an average of 40,000 new recruits per year between 
2000 and 2004.68 By 2008, the total budget for the NPF had risen to N169.9 billion, 
an increase of about 128 percent from the 2004 police budget.69 This funding did not 
buy better equipment, facilities, or training for the NPF. Rather, it just bought more 
poorly trained and unmotivated personnel.
The NPF’s budget increases have had little impact on the motivation of police 
personnel or on the structure of the NPF, in part because the increases are sporadic. For 
example, the NPF’s budget always increases sharply during election years.70 Although 
the reasons for this are not entirely clear, the correlation suggests that the increase is 
intended to win police support for the party in power, or even induce the police to com-
mit election related violence in favor of the ruling party. 
Historically, the remuneration of police personnel, especially in the lower ranks, 
has been abysmal, leaving most of them in or on the margins of extreme poverty.71 
According to the 2008 report of the Presidential Committee on Police Reform, fewer 
than 10 percent of all police personnel in Nigeria are housed in police barracks “and 
even a lesser percentage can claim to have personal dwellings that they can call their 
own and look forward to retiring into. As a result, the police have some of the most 
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dysfunctional families among occupational groups in the country. Even where barrack 
accommodation is provided, the facilities are dilapidated one room buildings, often with 
no toilet facilities.”72
This impoverishment contributes to the general climate of resentment among 
police personnel and feeds police abuses. Extortion is a common way in which “lower 
cadres try to supplement their meager incomes.”73 Some police personnel have report-
edly been reduced to begging to meet their subsistence needs.74 
Despite the prohibition of a labor action by NPF staff, personnel of the NPF 
undertook a nationwide strike in 2002, leading to the dismissal of then IGP Musiliu 
Smith. The government forestalled another police strike planned for February 2006.75 
In response to the 2006 strike threat, the federal government established a Presiden-
tial Committee on Police Reform headed by former Deputy Inspector-General of Police 
Alhaji Muhammadu Danmadami. That committee acknowledged that “out of frustra-
tion, junior officers of the Nigeria Police Force have become increasingly militant in 
their demands for improved conditions of service.”76 
TABLE 1: 
Structure of Rank and Remuneration in the Nigeria Police Force (2006)77
Rank Current yearly starting salary in Nigerian Naira (N)
1 Recruit 54,01278
2 Cadet Inspector 98,929
3 Cadet ASP 129,624
2 Constable 61,896
3 Corporal 70,448
4 Sergeant 83,400
6 Inspector 129,624
8 Assistant Superintendent 167,892
9 Deputy Superintendent 231,036
10 Superintendent 259,260
11 Chief Superintendent 288,012
12 Assistant Commissioner 314,580
13 Deputy Commissioner. 344,316
14 Commissioner 402,276
15 Assistant Inspector-General 470,628
16 Deputy Inspector-General 865,200
17 Inspector-General 1,194,600
In its 2006 report, the Presidential Committee on Police Reform recommended 
a radical overhaul of living conditions and remuneration for personnel of the NPF, to 
provide them with a living wage. Its recommendations included adjustments in basic 
police salaries ranging from a 350 percent increase for Police Constables to a 100 per-
cent increase for the inspector-general of police.79 The government’s white paper on 
the committee’s report merely noted the recommendations on police remuneration and 
only acceded to very modest adjustments in medical transport and housing allowances 
for police personnel.80 However, in June 2007, Nigeria’s federal government increased 
police salaries,81 and by the end of the year the government announced a consolidated 
salary structure for the police resulting in an increase in the gross monthly salary of 
a police constable to N26,158 or gross annual salary of N313,896.82 Even with this 
enhancement, NPF personnel remain poorly paid in comparison to police in most 
African countries.83 Despite recent improvements in their salaries and benefits, the level 
of compensation and conditions for police officers in Nigeria continue to be important 
factors in police abuse. In its 2008 report, the second Presidential Committee on Police 
Reform noted that underpaid police would likely turn to extortion to make ends meet: 
“responsibility for catering for the Police was inadvertently turned over to the general 
population who had to be extorted, coerced and intimidated by police personnel in the 
order to survive.”84 This confirms the 2006 findings of the first Presidential Committee 
on Police Reform, which reported that there was “widespread incidence of corruption 
and extortion by a significant proportion of the members of the Nigeria Police Force.”85
The logistics and infrastructure for policing are also seriously inadequate. In 
2006, the first Presidential Committee on Police Reform reported that:
  Basic operational logistics like statement papers, case file jackets, office lockers for storage 
of case files are no longer provided. Some of these items are procured by detectives with the 
assistance of complainants. Detectives take case files home, resulting at times in the loss or 
even destruction of such files and swapping of important statements in the file with state-
ments that cannot sustain conviction in court.86
The committee also found that the NPF was “far behind time in matters of police 
communication network, mobility and quick response to distress calls.”87 For a force 
of nearly 400,000 personnel, the communications infrastructure of the NPF in 2006 
included just 6,702 hand-held radios, 317 high frequency radios, 95 fax machines, and 
78 repeaters (radio relays).88 Two years later, in 2008, the second Presidential Commit-
tee on Police Reform concluded that communications within the NPF were in a “state 
of chaos.”89 Generally, the second Presidential Committee complained of: 
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  Gross inadequacies of human, material and technological resources made available to the 
Nigeria Police by successive Governments. The extent of this neglect can be clearly seen 
from the current state of police logistics such as accommodation, communication, forensic, 
arms and ammunition, transportation, including marine and air wing, etc., which has made 
it ineffective in crime detection and riot control, investigations and intelligence gathering.90
Despite a policy recommendation that the NPF should have at least 30,010 vehi-
cles, the force at the beginning of 2008 had “only 5,900 serviceable vehicles”—24,051 
fewer than recommended.91 In addition, the NPF “has a total holding of 371 boats out 
of which 108 are serviceable.”92 The force has no functional canine corps and only 742 
horses—critical for crowd control—out of a recommended 2,000.93 
Nigeria lacks the infrastructure for evidence-based policing. According to a 
November 2007 report by former Inspector-General of Police Ibrahim Coomasie, the 
NPF’s entire forensic infrastructure comprises a nonfunctioning forensic laboratory in 
Oshodi, Lagos (which is actually operated by the Federal Ministry of Health); a forensic 
facility in Ikoyi, Lagos; and two “government chemists” in Lagos Island and Kaduna.94 
These facilities either do not work or are badly neglected. In 2008, the second Presi-
dential Committee on Police Reform noted:
  The Oshodi facility, which is owned by the Federal Ministry of Health, has been in existence 
since 1953. Over the years, it has suffered neglect as a result of inadequate funding and 
poor staffing. Currently it lacks adequate equipment, working materials and qualified staff 
to operate successfully. In 1982, however, the Nigeria Police Force established its Forensic 
Laboratory in Lagos to support criminal investigations within the premises of the Force 
CID (Annex). The Laboratory was designed to have seven units, namely; Chemistry, Biology, 
Fingerprint, Photograph, Ballistics, Disputed Documents, Toolmarks and GSM Information 
Extraction. The laboratory currently looks like a ghost house, with little or no activity going 
on. It has remained in a dismal state, with the existing equipment inadequate and obsolete.95
In 2007, the Oshodi laboratory had only five scientific officers to meet the forensic 
needs of the entire country.96 The entire forensic capacity of the NPF in 2007 comprised 
only one trained forensic pathologist; there was no ballistics expert,97 and no DNA 
expert.98 Unsurprisingly, a 2007 review of the forensics and investigation capabilities in 
the NPF found “a near total absence of forensic science in police investigation in Nige-
ria. Fingerprints or photographs of the scene are rarely taken.”99 The review concluded 
that this gives “impetus to the use of third degree policing strategies by police investiga-
tors.”100 Thus within the NPF, there is a tradition of “excessive reliance by the police on 
information from witnesses and ‘confessions’ forcibly extracted from suspects” which 
encourages the use of violence.101 Additionally, there is no functioning system for the 
management of criminal justice information and intelligence. The 2006 Presidential 
Commission on the Reform of the Administration of Justice in Nigeria concluded that 
the “existing information systems are out-dated, fragmented and sometimes require 
arduous manual search and retrieval of data.”102 
Poor training, working conditions, and remuneration—in addition to nonexistent 
infrastructure for communications, investigation, and internal accountability—encour-
age a tradition of police brutality and an intolerably high propensity for police vio-
lence. These factors create a culture of predatory policing and police-for-hire in which 
NPF personnel routinely resort to unlawful methods in the treatment of suspects and 
detainees or exploit their positions through corrupt means to augment their official 
salaries. Police investigations essentially involve procuring confessions from suspects 
and detainees by any means necessary, including torture and other forms of coercion. 
The 2008 report of the second Presidential Committee on Police Reform acknowledges 
that “the standard of Police investigation is very low and hardly goes beyond taking 
statements and coercing suspects to confess.”103 Over 90 percent of criminal prosecu-
tions are based exclusively on confessions.104 The NPF lacks the capacity to successfully 
prosecute the most serious crimes. For instance, “out of the 5,883 robbery suspects held 
in four of Nigeria’s most populated prisons between 2000 and 2005, only 48 robbery 
convictions were secured with 4,014 being acquitted.”105 
These practices destroy public confidence in the police. The Presidential Commit-
tee on Police Reform in 2006 confirmed that:
  In Nigeria, the relationship between the Police and the public is largely characterized by 
mutual mistrust and hostility. The general causes of the negative opinion on Police by the 
public include the repressive nature of enforcement under authoritarian colonial and post-
colonial governments; general inefficiency of the Police due to inadequate facilities; corrup-
tion; poor remuneration and conditions of service, insensitivity and incivility towards the 
public by the Police.106
The Justice Goodluck Commission of Inquiry, which investigated the extrajudicial 
execution of six innocent civilians by police personnel in Abuja in June 2005 (known 
as the “Apo Six” murders), concluded that the NPF was “an unfriendly organization 
whose officers are generally high-handed and abrasive, always using their position to 
take unfair advantage of people in order to extort money from them.”107
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Violent Crime and Policing Practices
Although official statistics on crime in Nigeria are notoriously unreliable, it is clear 
that violent crime is pervasive.108 Official police figures show that reported incidents of 
murder increased from 1,629 in 1994 to 2,136 in 2003, while armed robbery increased 
from 2,044 in 1994 to 3,497 in 2003.109 These figures do not include incidents of extra-
judicial execution or other offenses committed by police and law enforcement agents. 
Several factors contribute to the growth of violent crime in Nigeria, including a 
rising youth population, poverty, and unemployment. Political violence has increased 
since the return to electoral politics in 1999, as some politicians cultivate, arm, and use 
political gangs to eliminate or intimidate their opponents or rig elections.110 Many com-
munities in Nigeria have seen an increase in the use of vigilantes and ethnic militias. 
Additionally, militants in the resource rich parts of Nigeria, especially the Niger Delta, 
have access to illicit arms. The confluence of these factors has increased the prevalence 
of and access to small arms in Nigeria, and “automatic and semi-automatic rifles, shot-
guns, machine guns and shoulder-fired rockets are readily available for purchase in 
parts of the country.”111 Together, these factors produce a high incidence of gun-related 
crimes, including armed robbery. 
Under Nigerian law, armed robbery, like murder and treason, carries a sentence of 
capital punishment. Those sentenced to death may be hanged or shot under an execu-
tion warrant signed by the governor of the state in which the offense was committed.112 
The growth of violent crime and the draconian legislative response to it created a 
law enforcement response that is heavy-handed, lacking rules of engagement, and char-
acterized by indiscriminate brutality. One researcher concluded that using the excuse 
of trying to fight armed robbery, “[p]olice . . .  have become excessively repressive on 
innocent and law abiding citizens,” leaving Nigerians with two kinds of fear—the fear 
of violent crime and the fear of unlawful police violence.113 
Policing in Nigeria is highly “militarized.”114 In 2005, Access to Justice, a Nigerian 
nongovernmental organization, reported that:
  The use of violence is an important aspect of the self-image of the Police. Police officers see 
themselves as agents of violence and consider the application of violence and force on the 
slightest provocation as fulfillment of their social essence.115 
An earlier study published in 2000 by the Centre for Law Enforcement and Edu-
cation (CLEEN) Foundation in Lagos established the prevalence of violence in encoun-
ters between the public and police: A survey of 637 respondents revealed that 73.2 
percent had witnessed an assault by the police, 22.5 percent had been threatened by the 
police with being shot, and another 14.8 percent had been assaulted by police. Of 197 
prisoners and detainees also interviewed in the CLEEN Foundation study, 81 percent 
suffered some form of physical abuse, with 39 percent reporting being burned with 
extremely hot objects while in police custody.116 As discussed in the next chapter, the 
NPF appears to have evolved a practice of executing persons accused or suspected of 
armed robbery, either through torture or by shooting.117
Organizational Structure of the Nigeria Police Force 
The management structure of the NPF is monolithic and centralized. With an estimated 
current staff of about 377,000 personnel, the NPF is the largest institution in Nigeria 
and also the country’s largest employer. The Police Act and the Police Regulations define 
the command and control structures of the NPF.118 This structure is headed by an IGP. 
Each of Nigeria’s 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) constitute a Police 
Command, headed by a police commissioner. The State Commands are in turn grouped 
into 12 Zonal Commands, each of which is headed by an assistant inspector-general 
(AIG) of police. Below the State Commands, each state is subdivided into Area Com-
mands under the operational control of subordinate officers, and Area Commands are 
in turn further broken down into Divisional Commands. Each Divisional Command 
comprises a collection of contiguous police posts and stations.119 
TABLE 2:
The NPF’s 12 Zonal Commands 
Zone 1: Kano, Katsina, and Jigawa States, with headquarters in Kano.
Zone 2: Lagos and Ogun States, with headquarters in Lagos.
Zone 3: Adamawa, Gombe, and Taraba States with headquarters in Yola (Adamawa State)
Zone 4: Benue, Nassarawa, and Plateau States, with headquarters in Makurdi (Benue State)
Zone 5: Bayelsa, Delta, and Edo States, with headquarters in Benin (Edo State)
Zone 6: Cross River, Ebonyi, Rivers, and Akwa Ibom States, with headquarters in Calabar 
(Cross-River State)
Zone 7: Federal Capital Territory, Kaduna, and Niger States, with headquarters in Abuja 
(Federal Capital Territory)
Zone 8: Ekiti, Kogi, and Kwara States, with headquarters in Lokoja (Kogi State)
Zone 9: Abia, Anambra, Enugu, and Imo States, with headquarters in Umuahia (Umuahia)
Zone 10: Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara States, with headquarters in Sokoto (Sokoto State)
Zone 11: Ondo, Osun, and Oyo States, with headquarters in Oshogbo (Osun State)
Zone 12: Bauchi, Borno, and Yobe States, with headquarters in Bauchi (Bauchi State)
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By the end of 2008, the Nigeria police force comprised 5,515 police stations, 1,115 
Police Divisions, 123 Area Commands, and 36 State Commands and one Federal Capital 
Territory Command. The force also houses some specialized units such as the Border 
Patrol, Bombs Disposal Squad, Ports Authority Police, and the Special Anti-Robbery 
Squad (SARS).120
TABLE 3:
Size and Distribution of Administrative Structure of NPF121
Administrative Unit Quantity and Distribution
Zonal Commands122 12
State Commands 
(Including Federal Capital Territory, Abuja)123
37 
Area Commands124 123
Police Divisions125 1,115
Police Stations126 5,515
Police Posts127 5,000
The headquarters of the force is located in Abuja, in the Federal Capital Territory. 
Known as the Force Headquarters, this is also the operational and administrative base 
of the IGP. The Force Headquarters is also known as “Louis Edet House,” named after 
the first Nigerian IGP. The Force Headquarters is organized into six departments, each 
headed by a deputy inspector-general (DIG) of police. Denominated alphabetically, the 
departments in the Force Headquarters are: 
• A Department: Administration
• B Department: Operations (including signals and communications)
• C Department: Works
• D Department: Criminal Investigations
• E Department: Training
• F Department: Planning, Research, and Statistics
In addition, the Office of the Force Secretary is headed by an assistant inspector-
general of police and the Force Public Relations Department may, under the police regu-
lations, be headed by “a staff officer of the rank of Assistant Commissioner or above.”128
The B and D Departments are the most significant in the NPF. The B Department 
manages and coordinates the responses of the police to active threats to law and order 
or public safety and security, such as riots, demonstrations, and situations of significant 
violence. Within the B Department, the NPF has a rapid deployment unit known as 
the Police Mobile Force (PMF) or MOPOL (Mobile Police). The PMF is a paramilitary, 
rapid deployment formation comprising about 30,000 men. Originally “established to 
act as a Police striking force in the event of riots or other serious disturbances occur-
ring within the federation,”129 PMF personnel “are now being used for duties that are 
irrelevant to their training, including orderlies to VIPs, ‘specie escort,’ [e.g., armored 
truck guards] static guard and road block duties.”130 Under the police regulations, the 
PMF may be armed, constituted and equipped as the president, acting on the advice of 
the Police Council, directs.131 
The MOPOL is sometimes seen as an elite unit within the NPF. It is headed 
by a commissioner of police at the Force Headquarters. MOPOL units in the states 
are organized into squadrons. Each squadron comprises a squadron commander, a 
second in command, and 632 men. At the point of mobilization, men of the PMF are 
required to be not more than 30 years old; while the commanding officer is required 
to be not more than 40 years. The duration of a regular tour of duty within the PMF is 
36 months. The operational structure of the NPF includes the 47 MOPOL squadrons 
spread all over the country.132 To most Nigerians, MOPOL is better known as “‘kill and 
go’ for their tendency to gun down innocent people and walk away.”133
The responsibilities of the D Department begin where those of the B Depart-
ment end. The D Department is responsible for police intelligence and criminal inves-
tigations. It maintains and operates the Force Criminal Investigations Department 
(FCID); the State Criminal Investigation Department (SCID) is its counterpart at the 
state command level. However, in the absence of an infrastructure for evidence-based 
policing, the SCIDs, like the MOPOL, have acquired a reputation for the habitual abuse 
of suspects—from the point of arrest through detention and interrogation during an 
investigation. According to the research gathered for this report, the only difference is 
that while the violations alleged against the SCIDs tend to take the form of prolonged 
torture, sometimes ending in painful death, the MOPOL is mostly associated in victim 
testimony with summary executions, usually by gunshot. Also within the SCIDs are 
the Special Anti-Robbery Squads (SARS), which were created in response to a per-
ceived nationwide escalation of gun-related robberies. SARS, going by different names 
in different states, became a feature of policing in Nigeria in the mid-1990s during the 
regime of the late General Sani Abacha.134 There are SARS units in each State Police 
Command and these units are coordinated at the Force Headquarters by a commis-
sioner of police. 
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The centralization of command and control in the NPF extends to budgetary 
and fiscal management in the office of the IGP. The concentration of resource man-
agement in one person within a monolithic organization encourages unaccountable 
patronage, corruption, and financial mismanagement. As evidence of this, a recent 
inspector-general of police was convicted of money laundering and corruption,135 and 
scandals of financial misappropriation trailed the exit of his successor in June 2007.136 
Misappropriation of funds diverts resources meant for police operations before they 
reach the points of need, operations, and service delivery in the communities. As a 
result, the operational formations and personnel of the police lack essential investiga-
tion, patrol, communications, and protection tools and equipment. In turn, this inhibits 
the operational effectiveness of the NPF. The first Presidential Committee on Police 
Reform diagnosed this problem in 2006  and recommended that “allocation of funds 
should be made directly . . . to the Force Headquarters, the Zonal Commands, State 
Commands, Area Commands and Divisional Commands respectively, for the day-to-day 
operations of the police.”137
Recent Investigations and Reports on the Nigeria 
Police Force 
In recent years, several authoritative reports on different aspects of policing and police 
abuses in Nigeria have been issued by national and international nongovernmental 
organizations, inquiries by presidential commissions and committees, and the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary or Extrajudicial Executions. All the major 
investigations confirm a pattern of “sexual assault, oppression, unwarranted arrests, 
intimidation, extortion” by the police.138
In June 2005, the Nigerian NGO Access to Justice issued a report titled Breaking 
Point, in which it presented graphic accounts of how “the use of torture is extremely 
widespread within the Nigeria Police Force and is an institutionalized and routine prac-
tice.”139 In its July 2005 report, Rest in Pieces, Human Rights Watch “found the use 
of torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment by the Nigerian Police 
Force to be widespread and routine,” including “brutal acts of torture, dozens of which 
resulted in death . . . perpetrated by and with the knowledge of senior police officers.”140 
The pattern of police abuses was so pervasive that Human Rights Watch concluded 
that there were “deeply engrained societal attitudes that accept police torture and other 
abuses as legitimate tools to combat crime.”141 Far from public acceptance of police 
violence and abuses, however, the general attitude of resignation reported by Human 
Rights Watch reflects the absence of effective remedies for those who suffer police 
abuse, the pervasiveness of impunity, and the widespread loss of faith in the police as an 
institution for the protection of public safety and security. As confirmed by the second 
Presidential Committee on Police Reform in 2008, the “public feels frustrated because 
it has no control and no means of redress.”142
In November 2006, Amnesty International issued a report on its investigation 
of sexual violence by internal security agencies in Nigeria which showed that “rape 
of women and girls by both the police and security forces . . . is acknowledged to be 
endemic in Nigeria.”143 Specifically, Amnesty alleged that “Nigerian police force and 
security forces commit rape in many different circumstances, both on and off duty. Rape 
is at times used strategically to coerce and intimidate entire communities.”144 Despite 
this pattern of misconduct, the perpetrators routinely escape punishment and the vic-
tims are denied access to remedies. A 2005 nationwide study by the CLEEN Foundation, 
a Nigerian NGO that promotes public safety, security, and justice, found that of 10,000 
victims of rape and sexual violence, only 18.1 percent reported the offense to the NPF, 
believing the NPF would not investigate their reports diligently.145
The pattern of misconduct reported by these nongovernmental organizations is 
essentially confirmed by official governmental and inter-governmental investigations. 
In its August 2005 report, the Justice Goodluck Commission of Inquiry into the Apo 
Six police killings documented extensive evidence of a police force that had through 
“intimidation and oppression . . . instilled fear into the residents.”146 In his 2006 report 
based on a mission to Nigeria, the UN Special Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary or 
Extrajudicial Executions observed that torture was an intrinsic part of law enforcement 
in Nigeria and found a “largely unaccountable Police force, a system that does little to 
deter Police killings or deaths in custody, and impunity for those accused of associated 
misconduct.”147 The Presidential Committee on Police Reform in 2006 concluded that:
  Instances of Police brutality are common during crime control; crowd control during public 
events and ceremonies; control of processions, protests, demonstrations, investigation, and 
at checkpoints. Extrajudicial killings, summary executions of suspects and revenge killings 
are also widely reported. Due to a combination of poor training, inadequate infrastructure, 
and absence of respect for due process and human rights, the Police often resort to torture 
to extract confession and information from suspects. Another practice that has brought the 
Police into disrepute is that of arresting relations of a suspect as substitutes or hostages. In 
addition, individuals are arrested and detained on flimsy grounds, with a view to extorting 
money from them.148
The cumulative result of all this, as confirmed in the 2008 report of the second 
Presidential Committee on Police Reform, is “the loss of public confidence in the integ-
rity of police personnel.”149 The pattern of police misconduct and impunity established 
in these various investigations and reports has yet to be addressed.
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V. The Normative Framework 
 Governing Policing in Nigeria
The powers, functions, and procedures of the NPF are founded on Nigeria’s 1999 Con-
stitution and regulated by law. As the principal law enforcement agency in Nigeria, the 
NPF exists to apply and enforce laws. As an institution created by law, the NPF and 
its personnel can only lawfully function within the ambit of the laws that create them. 
In addition to the constitution, the principal legislation in Nigeria governing the 
operations and functions of the police includes the following:
• the Police Act,150 and subsidiary legislation made under it
• the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforce-
ment) Act151
• the Criminal Procedure Act applicable to the 17 states in southern Nigeria152
• the Criminal Procedure Code applicable to the 19 states in northern Nigeria and 
to the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja153 
• the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act of 2001
• the coroners’ laws of the respective states of Nigeria 
Past and current leaders of the NPF have acknowledged the principle that the 
police are created and regulated by law. Addressing a public gathering in Abuja in 
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December 2005, then Inspector-General of Police Sunday Ehindero stated the doctrine 
of the police as follows:
  It is obvious that the duties of the Nigeria Police Force are a direct consequence of the powers 
conferred on it by law. It becomes mandatory that the law must regulate the performance 
of its duties relating to arrest, detention, search and seizure, and the use of force. In other 
words, these duties must be exercised strictly within the limits prescribed for the Police by 
law. And any form of exercise of these powers which does not strictly conform to the prescrip-
tions of the law can have unpleasant consequences for the Police Force (as a corporate entity, 
as well as for the individual Police personnel).154
As an institution established by law within the public service, the NPF is also gov-
erned institutionally by the civil service rules and financial regulations applicable to all 
federal institutions.155 To direct the operations and management of the NPF, the Police 
Act empowers the inspector-general of police to issue subsidiary legislation through 
regulations, standing orders, administrative instructions, and circulars. All staff of the 
NPF ought to be conversant with and have access to these applicable laws and stan-
dards. However, in its 2006 report, the first Presidential Committee on Police Reform 
acknowledged that “these important regulatory books that all officers must acquaint 
themselves with are either in short supply or no longer in circulation. The result is that 
many young police officers are not familiar with them, to the detriment of their pro-
fessional competence.”156 In practice, therefore, and in spite of the formidable body of 
legal standards that regulate its operations, the NPF tends to function outside the law. 
Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution creates the NPF as a federal institution and prohibits 
the existence of state or other police bodies.157 In addition to the police, however, other 
law enforcement agencies exist in Nigeria. These include the State Security Service, the 
National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commis-
sion, the Federal Road Safety Commission, and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence 
Corps. Both the Immigration Service and the Customs and Excise department also have 
powers of investigation, arrest, and detention under the laws governing them. Like the 
police, these are all federal institutions established by law and are empowered to under-
take investigation and prosecution.158 
The first Presidential Committee on Police Reform in 2006 concluded that the 
existence of these agencies breached the constitutional prohibition against multiple or 
parallel police agencies and complained about a “proliferation of agencies (leading) to 
duplication of duties, which subsequently creates rivalry, conflict and inefficiency.”159 
As noted by the committee, each of these agencies also maintains holding cells and 
detention centers at which human rights violations occur. Ultimately, such violations 
are likely to be “blamed on the Police, as the primary law enforcement agent in the 
country.”160 This report focuses exclusively on the police. It does not extend to the activi-
ties of any other law enforcement institutions and does not attribute to the NPF any 
responsibility for the failings of other internal security agencies in Nigeria.
Under Nigeria’s Constitution, ultimate operational control of the police resides 
with the president. He appoints the inspector-general of police161 and: 
  [m]ay give to the Inspector-General of the Nigeria Police such lawful directions with respect to 
the maintaining and securing of public safety and public order as he may consider necessary, 
and the Inspector-General shall comply with those directions or cause them to be complied 
with.162 
The Police Act contains similar provisions,163 and provides specifically that “the 
President shall be charged with operational control of the Force.”164 In its 2008 report, 
the Presidential Committee on Electoral Reform argued that these provisions of the 
Police Act “which vest operational control of the police in the President of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria are in contravention of the 1999 Constitution” and recommended 
their amendment.165 In the states, the constitution permits elected state governors to 
give similar operational directions to the state police commissioners but “before carry-
ing out any such directions . . . the Commissioner of Police may request that the matter 
be referred to the President or such minister of the Government of the Federation as 
may be authorized in that behalf by the President for his directions.”166 These provi-
sions have the effect of over-centralizing policing and undermining the independence 
and operational effectiveness of the NPF. 
The constitution contains, among other guarantees, rights to life,167 liberty,168 fair 
hearing, and due process;169 prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment;170 and gives victims of human rights violations a right of access to courts 
for redress and remedies.171 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Rati-
fication and Enforcement) Act,172 which makes the African Charter part of Nigeria’s 
domestic law, reinforces these human rights guarantees which are essential for effective 
policing. In particular, both Nigeria’s Constitution and the African Charter guarantee 
the presumption of innocence and prohibit torture. 
The presumption of innocence is the foundation of police investigation. Through 
investigation, the police gather evidence with which to rebut the presumption in specific 
cases. However, the NPF lacks the infrastructure and skills for basic investigation. In 
2006, the Presidential Committee on Police Reform reported that:
  There is only one trained ballistician left in the Force and we were told he would soon go on 
retirement.173 There are no more fingerprint experts and the forensic laboratory has not taken 
off. The Police dogs have either been retired or starved to death ... The Police pathologists are 
few and the hospitals are not well equipped. To crown it all, there is widespread corruption 
amongst police detectives.174 
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Without the infrastructure and skills to support criminal investigations, the NPF 
is institutionally unable to respect the presumption of innocence—or even maintain 
credible records. Instead, “they now resort to parading suspects in handcuffs and others 
killed by them extrajudicially, such as armed robbers to impress the general public that 
they are working, when, at this stage, the innocence of the suspects should be presumed 
and their human rights protected by the Police.”175 In 2006, the first Presidential Com-
mittee on Police Reform recommended the NPF discontinue its practice of parading 
suspects. In its official response to the report, the federal government rejected this 
recommendation but required that the identities of suspects should be covered when 
paraded.176 It is impossible to identify a legitimate objective for parading suspects whose 
identities, including presumably their faces, must be covered. Not only are innocent 
people treated as if guilty; the generally poor performance of the police makes it more 
difficult to convict those who are actually guilty. The effect of this is a tradition of com-
promised investigations and unsuccessful prosecutions which, the Nigerian Supreme 
Court has noted, results “in acquittal of criminals who should have been convicted.”177 
First enacted in 1943 as the Police Ordinance and last updated by military decree 
in 1967, the Police Act is the principal instrument that establishes and regulates the 
structures, functions, and powers of the NPF. Section Four of the act prescribes the 
functions of the NPF to include the prevention and detection of crime, apprehension 
of offenders, preservation of law and order, protection of life and property, enforcement 
of all laws and regulations with which they are charged, and military duties within 
or outside Nigeria as may be required of them. The Police Act empowers the police 
to undertake criminal prosecutions.178 As a constraint on police abuse, the Police Act 
provides that police officers are legally responsible for any crimes or other misconduct 
committed by them in the course of their duty and the Police Act does not exempt any 
police officer from such responsibility.179
For this purpose, the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Act (both appli-
cable in the states of southern Nigeria) as well as the Penal Code180 and the Criminal 
Procedure Code (applicable in the states of northern Nigeria) define most crimes known 
to Nigerian law, prescribe punishments for them, and establish procedures for pros-
ecuting and holding people accountable for such crimes. While the crime of torture 
does not exist in Nigerian law, the Criminal and Penal Codes contain extensive pro-
visions regarding offenses against the person, including assault, murder, and sexual 
assault. Except when committed in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, crimes against 
the person—ranging from murder to different forms of assault—are state offenses 
liable to be prosecuted by the state Ministries of Justice under the leadership of the 
state attorneys-general. Although ultimate control of criminal prosecutions resides with 
the attorneys-general, “most of the criminal cases in the country handled by the lower 
courts, especially the magistrate courts, are prosecuted by the Police.”181 Thus, the NPF 
is also responsible for investigating and prosecuting allegations of crimes committed 
by its own personnel.
All Nigerian states have coroners’ laws that mandate an inquest into all deaths 
that result from police encounters or which occur in prison or police custody.182 For this 
purpose, magistrates act as coroners. A coroner, who invariably sits as a magistrate, 
undertakes an inquest “whenever there is a reasonable cause to suspect that the cause of 
death is unknown; the death is sudden, unexpected or unnatural; violent or suspicious; 
due to a medical intervention, negligence or misconduct, or from a known or unknown 
cause while a person is in custody of any type.”183
Force Order 237, which regulates the use of firearms by the police, is an important 
part of the legal framework regulating the NPF’s work. Promulgated by the inspector-
general of police, Force Order 237 comprises eight paragraphs and, among other things, 
permits a police officer to use lethal force where “he cannot by any other means arrest 
a person who takes flight in order to avoid arrest; provided the offence is such that the 
accused may be punished with death or imprisonment for seven years or more.”184 
This order “covers the case where a fugitive has not been in lawful custody and takes 
to a flight in order to avoid arrest in the first instance.”185 In effect, Force Order 237 
legitimizes disproportionate and even indiscriminate use of lethal force by police per-
sonnel against people suspected of relatively minor offenses. Because Force Order 237 
appears to contravene the guarantee of the right to life contained in both the Nigerian 
Constitution and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, it is of doubtful 
constitutionality. Until abrogated in its present form, however, it represents the opera-
tional doctrine of the NPF on the use of lethal force.   
As a general rule of Nigerian criminal law, any person authorized by law to use 
force is criminally responsible for any excessive use of force.186 However, Force Order 
237 employs vague language with respect to extrajudicial executions by the police, which 
makes it difficult to enforce. The order affords justification for extrajudicial killings by 
police, especially in the case of suspects thought to have committed a serious crime, 
such as armed robbery, which carries the death penalty.187 It is perhaps no coincidence 
that victims of extrajudicial executions by the police in Nigeria are usually described as 
armed robbery suspects who were either fleeing custody or attacking police personnel. 
As the UN Special Rapporteur put it “these rules practically provide the police carte 
blanche to shoot and kill at will.”188 He further noted that the police readily use this as 
a pretext to justify extrajudicial execution such that when “a victim is killed in custody, 
an attempted escape may be cited.”189
The framework of legal standards on policing in Nigeria also includes interna-
tional laws and treaties and laws accepted by or applicable to Nigeria as a member of the 
international community. Nigeria has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)190 and the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhu-
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man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention),191 both of which 
prohibit torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by law enforcement 
and state agents. Nigeria’s Constitution requires that international treaties must be spe-
cifically adopted into domestic law in order to be directly enforceable within the coun-
try.192 While Nigeria’s ratification of both the Torture Convention and the ICCPR does 
not automatically make either legal instrument domestically applicable in the country, 
it is nevertheless significant in defining the scope of legal norms that Nigeria desires 
to be associated with internationally. Having ratified both instruments, Nigeria accepts 
under international law its obligation not to act in ways contrary to the conventions. 
Nigeria cannot avoid these obligations by resorting to its domestic law. 
Neither the ICCPR nor the Torture Convention has been specifically adopted into 
domestic law in Nigeria. However, the prohibition of torture is very well established in 
international law as a peremptory norm.193 The African Charter on Huma n and Peoples’ 
Rights, which is part of Nigeria’s domestic law, similarly prohibits torture.194 Nigeria 
indicates its acceptance of this principle by firmly prohibiting torture and other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in its 1999 Constitution.195 Nigerian 
law prohibits the admission into evidence of any confessional statements obtained by 
means of torture or similar coercion.196 The Torture Convention defines torture as:
  Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information 
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected 
of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason 
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain is inflicted by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.197
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has in its jurisprudence 
explained the scope of due process guarantees and the prohibition against torture under 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. In Zegveld and Ephrem v. Eritrea,198 
the African Commission held that these due process guarantees in the African Charter 
imply that “every detained person must have prompt access to a lawyer and to their fam-
ilies and their rights with regards to physical and mental health must be protected.”199 
With reference to crimes of sexual violence, it is now firmly established in inter-
national law that acts of sexual violence, including rape, carried out by state agents con-
stitute a form of torture.200 In this context, sexual violence includes “any act of [a] sexual 
nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive,”201 and 
may include “acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.”202 Rape, as 
a specific form of sexual violence, is understood to mean “a physical invasion of a sexual 
nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive,”203 and could 
include the insertion of objects into bodily orifices not considered to be intrinsically 
sexual, such as  thrusting a piece of wood or metal into the sexual organs of a person.204 
The guarantees of the right to life and prohibitions against torture and other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment include an obligation on the state to diligently and 
independently investigate and prosecute allegations of extrajudicial execution or torture. 
In the Sudan cases,205 the complaint before the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights included allegations verified by a UN Special Rapporteur that unarmed 
civilians in Darfur, in western Sudan, were the victims of torture and extrajudicial execu-
tions.206 In response, the Sudanese government constituted an inquiry team whose 
membership included officers from the police district against whom the allegations 
were made and the district prosecutor working with them. The Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights held that:
  Investigations must be carried out by entirely independent individuals, provided with the 
necessary resources, and their findings should be made public and prosecutions initiated 
in accordance with the information uncovered. Constituting a commission of the District 
Prosecutor and police and security officials, as was the case in the 1987 Commission of 
Enquiry set up by the Governor of South Darfur, overlooks the possibility that police and 
security forces may be implicated in the very massacres they are charged to investigate. The 
commission of enquiry, in the Commission’s view, by its very composition, does not provide 
the required guarantees of impartiality and independence.207
In theory, therefore, the operations of the NPF are governed by domestic laws and 
regulations, as well as international treaties and legal norms. In practice, however—as 
this report documents—the actual operations of the NPF are characterized by institu-
tionalized disregard for these standards. Far from compliance with the law, the NPF 
operates as an outlaw institution. 
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VI. Extrajudicial Killings by Police
Extrajudicial killings are a routine feature of policing in Nigeria. Hundreds of Nigeri-
ans are murdered each year by the NPF. Field monitoring uncovered the existence of 
an unwritten rule in police stations: “confirmed” armed robbery suspects should be 
“escorted,” sent on an “errand,” or “transferred to Abuja”—all euphemisms for the 
unlawful summary and extrajudicial execution of suspects. Suspects are “confirmed” 
through torture and “escorted” or “transferred” through summary execution or disap-
pearance. 
Persons suspected of, or arrested for, armed robbery are particularly at risk of 
extrajudicial execution. “Abdullahi,” a local politician in Kano State, described being tor-
tured in September 2006 at the Karfi police post in Kano. Abdullahi was being beaten 
by a police officer and thought he would be killed. But he was saved by the timely inter-
vention of a police sargeant who called off his more enthusiastic colleague by noting 
that what the colleague was about to do to Abdullahi was “only reserved for robbers.”208 
Innocent Daa’gba, a lawyer in private practice, described for a NOPRIN researcher 
the standard NPF practice as follows: 
  Once an accused is arrested and is suspected to be a robber, instead of taking him to court, 
they would rather want to take him along the road. They take the suspect to the highway 
under the pretext that they are going to conduct further investigation, only to come back and 
report that in the course of moving on the highway the suspect attempted to run, so they had 
no choice but to take him down.209
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The police frequently label as “armed robbers” the innocent victims of their extra-
judicial executions. Not only does this label help cover their crimes, but it exacerbates 
public fear of armed robbers and creates the perception that anyone described as such 
automatically loses the rights to both life and due process. On December 12, 2008, 
the police in Makun, Ogun State, shot and killed Waliyu Abudu, a wife, mother, and 
poultry farm worker. The killing appeared entirely unprovoked. In the face of mounting 
evidence from Abudu’s family and employers that she was an innocent victim of unjus-
tifiable police homicide, the Ogun State Police Command staged an elaborate press 
conference in December 2008 at which they branded Abudu as the leader of an armed 
robbery gang. The police refused to release her body to the family for postmortem or 
autopsy and provided no evidence to substantiate their public accusation. No one in the 
NPF was ever punished for Abudu’s death.
Field monitoring revealed that police personnel refer to detainees marked for exe-
cution as “rams” or “bush meat.” In all states, two NPF units—the State Anti-Robbery 
Squads (SARS) and State Criminal Investigation Divisions (SCIDs)—are widely believed 
responsible for extrajudicial executions. Certain locations are also well known to the 
public as sites for killing by police. The police checkpoint at the Abuja Junction on the 
Abuja-Kaduna Road is one such spot, remarkable for the perennial stench of decompos-
ing human remains. Police sources in Anambra State pointed NOPRIN researchers to 
dump sites and graves for victims of police killings in Awada near the MCC settlement 
and in Upper Iweka, both in Onitsha, Anambra State. They also mentioned other iso-
lated dumping sites, such as the one at Agu, Awka, also in Anambra State. 
Following an execution, the police often inform the victim’s family that the victim 
has been sent on an “errand,” “escorted,” or “transferred to Abuja.” Dayo Anjorin, a 
student of the Osun State College of Technology who lived in Ibadan with his family, left 
his home around January 31, 2007 to visit his school in connection with his posting for 
the compulsory National Youth Service Corps program. His family last saw him in the 
cells of the SARS in Oshogbo, Osun State, about one week later when he was reported 
to be “in very bad condition with broken hands, legs, and could not stand on his own. 
There were several wounds all over his body and blood was gushing out of the right 
side of his abdomen and he could not speak.”210 The family never heard from or saw 
Anjorin again. When they returned to ask for Anjorin around February 15, they were 
told that “he had been taken to the Force Headquarters.”211
In another instance of police deception, Ekeh Nwose’s family located him in the 
cells of the Area F Police Station in Ikeja, Lagos State, two days after he left his home 
around March 15, 2005, to have a meal with a friend from school. The family was initially 
advised to pay a bribe of N11,000 for the privilege of visiting Nwose in detention. After 
they paid they bribe, they were told that Nwose had been transferred to the SCID in Panti, 
Lagos. Over one year later, in March 2006, after persistent inquiries, the police informed 
them that Nwose had been “transferred to Abuja.” He has never been seen nor heard 
from again and the police have declined to provide any information on his whereabouts. 
After Precious Chiudo Egbuchilam was arrested in June 2005, his brother, Corpo-
ral Amos Egbuchilam of the Nigerian Army, asked to see him. His insistence on seeing 
his brother only led to threats from the police at the Lagos SCID in Yaba. An NPF officer 
told Cpl. Egbuchilam that his brother was an armed robber, and that he must be “very 
stupid” to have asked about an armed robber. The police threatened Cpl. Egbuchilam 
if he persisted with further inquiries. One police officer reportedly asked him: “Is your 
brother not a criminal? Don’t you know what we do with robbers here?”212 The police 
never provided any further information concerning Precious’s disappearance.
On April 16, 2007, in the heat of a general election, the Adavi Police Station near 
Okene in Kogi State was attacked in an incident in which the assailants also reportedly 
stole 21 rifles and “thousands [of rounds] of assorted ammunition”213 and, according to a 
police source, killed one police sergeant. At least ten other people were reportedly killed 
in this attack.214 The Kogi State Police Command believed that the attack was directed by 
a political gang active in Okene led by one Mohammed Awela. Following this incident, 
the police declared Awela wanted and branded him “an enemy of the State.” On March 
16, 2008, the police in Kogi State shot and killed Awela, mutilated his body and put 
his remains on public display at the State Police Command headquarters in Lokoja, 
the state capital. This display was accompanied by general revelry and merry-making, 
including celebratory discharge of gunshots by police. When friends and relations of 
Awela asked for the release of his remains, the police refused.
A Human Abattoir: Mass Killings by the Police
Mass killings by members of the NPF occur often across Nigeria.215 In most cases, these 
go uninvestigated and unpunished. Such killings are sometimes administered as repri-
sals for perceived infractions against police personnel or during alleged crime control 
measures. On February 25, 2008, the Ogaminana community, a settlement near Okene, 
in Kogi State, was attacked by a contingent of the Police Mobile Force. Media reports 
described the incident in Ogaminana as a “rampage,”216 a “reprisal attack,”217 and “a 
massacre”218 and reported that the police were “said to be avenging the killing of two of 
their colleagues by hoodlums.”219 Initial media estimates of the number of people killed 
in the Ogaminana encounter ranged from 15 to 50.220 The police responded by blaming 
the community for the raid, including the killings and destruction.221 
On September 17, 2007, Eyeti Ekiebong Enwang—a community in Mbo Local 
Government Area of Akwa Ibom State—was similarly attacked by a contingent of over 
100 police angered by the reported theft of more than N8,000 collected by police from 
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commuters at a roadblock in the community. The attack left at least five people dead 
and several more missing.222 
Less than one week earlier, on September 11, 2007, police personnel invited 
to assist in managing an uprising by prisoners in the overcrowded Agodi Prison in 
Ibadan,223 Oyo State, opened fire on the prisoners. Eleven prisoners were killed and 
sixteen were severely wounded.224 As reported by the National Human Rights Commis-
sion following its investigation into the incident:
  When the Police arrived, apparently without proper profiling and assessment of the situation, 
on entrance, they pumped a large dose of teargas into the prison and opened lethal fire into 
the crowded compound of inmates.225 
One of the victims of the Agodi Prison killings was Wasiu Owolabi. Owolabi was 
first arrested early in 2002 by police in Ibadan. The Oyo State High Court granted him 
bail in 2003 but the police subsequently re-arrested and detained him on undisclosed 
charges. Owolabi’s sister, Tawakalitu, then petitioned the National Human Rights Com-
mission on his behalf. While this petition was pending, Owolabi, who had been in 
pretrial custody for nearly four years, was killed by the police during the Agodi Prison 
incident. 
On September 14, 2006, in Delta State, the police allegedly attacked the village 
of Afiesere in Ughelli North Local Government Area, killing at least 22 people.226 The 
police attack was apparently in retaliation for an earlier incident in which two NPF 
officers were killed. No official inquiry into the police attack ever took place, nor were 
any perpetrators prosecuted for the killings of the two police officers. 
On or about August 9, 2006, personnel of the NPF paraded 12 alleged armed rob-
bers—including a 12-year-old—before the media at the Central Police Station in Umua-
hia, capital of Abia State. They claimed to have arrested the suspects after an exchange of 
gunfire with the police. Some of those in custody had gunshot wounds, and four others 
were killed during the incident at Olokobe-Ndume community in Umuahia North Local 
Government Area of Abia State. Following the parade, the police summarily executed 
the suspects and deposited their bodies at the premises of the Federal Medical Centre 
in Umuahia. They claimed that the executed victims signed confessional statements 
before they were killed. On August 17, 2006, the authorities of the Federal Medical 
Centre arranged a mass burial for the decomposing bodies of the victims. There were 
no autopsies or inquests. The police later organized a press conference at which they 
announced the executions.227 
In the second week of July 2006, a joint patrol of NPF officers and Nigerian Army 
soldiers summarily executed 14 young men, including a pastor, at Iyiowa Odoekpe, in 
Onitsha, Anambra State, on the allegation that they were members of the Movement 
for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). The bodies of the victims were allegedly 
buried in a mass grave dug beside the police barracks in Onitsha. Eight others who 
were killed in similar circumstances by the SARS were buried at the MCC settlement’s 
burial ground, New Cemetery, at Oraifite Street, also in Onitsha. Reports of similar 
mass extrajudicial executions of alleged MASSOB members were common in 2007.228 
On April 18, 2006, police pursuing an alleged group of armed robbers in Benin-
City, Edo State, “opened fire on a commercial vehicle with four persons feared dead 
and several others seriously wounded.”229 In Anambra State, Ifeanyi Onuchukwu, who 
was detained by the SARS in Awka for 15 days between October and November 2004, 
alleged that he witnessed the execution of 20 persons accused of armed robbery by 
operatives of SARS in Awka on November 4, 2004.230
In Enugu, Enugu State, an ex-detainee at the SCID reported to a NOPRIN 
researcher that he witnessed “uncountable” executions while he was detained there for 
over one month in the first quarter of 2006. According to this ex-detainee: 
  Every time they want to execute people they will come around 6 p.m., call the names of some 
inmates and tell them to prepare for court. Late in the night they are taken out and executed 
and the next morning they order about two people from the cell to wash off the blood from 
their vehicles. It is the blood stain that confirms that inmates have been killed. And they have 
the same excuse for every family that comes to see any detainee that has been “dispatched”—
“he has been transferred to Abuja for further investigations.”231 
NOPRIN’s investigations in Enugu revealed how such extrajudicial executions are 
conducted: detainees are shackled by the legs and arms and driven in a police vehicle to 
the outskirts of Enugu metropolis, sometimes close to the University of Nigeria Enugu 
Teaching Hospital or to Ngwo Town (Milken Hill), where they are shot. The corpses are 
then collected and deposited at the teaching hospital’s mortuary. NPF personnel who 
spoke to NOPRIN on condition of anonymity alleged that suspects were often used for 
“target practice.” Suspects were told to exit from the police vehicle they were traveling 
in and run for their lives. They were subsequently shot while running away to make it 
appear as if the suspects had been shot while trying to escape. These alleged killings 
usually occur at night or in pre-dawn hours of the morning.
According to the report by the Justice Goodluck Commission of Inquiry, on 
June 8, 2005, the police in Abuja summarily executed six young persons, planted 
guns on their bodies, and branded them armed robbers. Following violent protests 
by the community, the federal government instituted a judicial commission of inquiry 
into the killings, which became known as the “Apo Six” murders. In its report, the Good-
luck Commission asserted that the six murders were not an isolated incident. The report 
suggested a pattern of behavior in which police execute suspects, then frame them, and 
then conduct a campaign of disinformation about the victims. The commission noted 
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that the killing of these victims “would have passed for the usual excuse of ‘shootout 
with armed robbers’ as indeed the Police had through the media labeled them armed 
robbers and hurriedly buried them, but for the vigilance of some citizens who knew that 
they were not armed robbers.”232 In this case, the commission exonerated the victims, 
found the police culpable for the murders, and recommended the prosecution of the 
officers involved. To date, no NPF officers have been found guilty of the murders.233
In another example of police abuse, NOPRIN researchers learned that between 
March 5 and 10, 2005, the police in Borno State, on Nigeria’s northeastern border 
with Chad and Cameroon, arrested six youths—Ibrahim Isa, John Moses, Peter Joseph, 
Bukar Audu, Iliya Dauda, and Zanna Musa—on charges of armed robbery. Arrested in 
different locations around the state, the young men, between the ages of 22 and 30, 
were held at the Ibrahim Taiwo Police Station in Maiduguri, Borno’s capital. On April 
27, 2005, more than a month and a half after the arrests, the police paraded these 
youths before the press as armed robbers.234 Two weeks later, when their families sought 
to visit the suspects, the police reported that the suspects had been transferred to the 
SCID in Maiduguri. When the families went to the SCID, the police further informed 
them that their sons had never been brought there. On May 10, 2005, the dead bodies 
of all six boys were found in the mortuary of the State Specialist Hospital in Maiduguri. 
The police in Maiduguri claimed that they executed the boys when they attempted 
to escape from custody. There was no inquest and no one in the NPF has been held 
responsible for the killings.
Similarly, on October 18, 2004, some commercial motorcycle operators in Tudun-
Wada, Kaduna, witnessed the police hurriedly burying a truckload of dead bodies at the 
Bachama cemetery. When this information became public, an uproar ensued and the 
bodies of 19 youths were exhumed. The police had told the cemetery attendants that 
they were there to bury the corpses of armed robbers shot during various police opera-
tions in different parts of Kaduna State, and the attendants allowed them to proceed. 
However, after the bodies were exhumed, residents of Tundun-Wada claimed that some 
of those killed were participants in an anti-government protest over a hike in the price 
of petroleum products, organized by the Nigerian Labour Congress a few days earlier.235 
Some of the victims’ parents confirmed that their children had been arrested by 
the police and that before their extrajudicial executions the parents had visited their 
children at the police station. The police responded by issuing two conflicting accounts. 
In its initial reaction to the incident, the State Police Command issued a press statement 
which claimed that:
  There is no iota of truth in the story. The Command in its day-to-day operations encountered 
armed bandits in gun battles some of which occasionally result in causalities on both the 
part of the police and the robbers. Furthermore, Police do not engage in the burial of dead 
robbers. This is the sole responsibility of mortuary/local government personnel ...236 
However, in their submission to the judicial commission of inquiry into the kill-
ings, the police later claimed that while the victims were being transported to the Rigasa 
Police Station in Kaduna, they attacked their armed police escorts and jumped out of 
the moving truck fleeing in different directions. It was at this point, according to the 
police, that they opened fire on the fleeing suspects, killing all of them. 
Take No Prisoners: “Wasting” the “Robbers” 
NOPRIN researchers found that alleged armed robbery suspects frequently die in police 
custody in Nigeria. Police officers who spoke on condition of anonymity to the report’s 
researchers justified the practice of “wasting” suspected armed robbers because of the 
supposed failure of the justice system to “cage” them. The police officers interviewed 
claimed that on several occasions the courts granted bail to suspected armed robbers 
who then returned to the streets and killed police personnel. They claimed that once 
released, the suspects, seeking revenge for torture inflicted on them by the authorities, 
would often target the police for attacks and execution. As narrated by members of the 
NPF, there is a war between the police and armed robbers in which collateral damage, 
usually innocent civilians, is inevitable. Police use these conditions to cover their extra-
judicial executions—anyone they kill is then labeled an armed robber. It is almost as if 
suspected armed robbers in Nigeria are exempt from the constitutional guarantees of 
life and due process, including the presumption of innocence. 
TABLE 4:
Official Figures of Killings in Police Encounters 2000–2006237
Year Alleged Robbers Killed Police Killed Police Injured
2000 595 182 69
2001 376 133 87
2002 317 120 57
2003 545 144 148
2004 569 111 112
2005 252 129 58
2006 329 111 53
Total 2,983 930 584
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The most notable feature of the official statistics on police killings is the absence 
of any figures for injured “robbers.” The figures suggest that not a single “robber” was 
injured in armed encounters between NPF personnel and criminal suspects in the 
seven years between 2000 and 2006. Failure to compile or maintain such statistics 
could suggest that the police have a take-no-prisoners policy of executing any victims or 
survivors in all encounters with alleged robbers. If this is the case, it would also mean 
that alleged robbers injured in police encounters are summarily “wasted” after being 
picked up by the police. Even if the absence of records indicating injured “robbers” was 
merely an oversight by the NPF, such an oversight speaks volumes about how the police 
view those outside of their own ranks—people who matter so little that their injuries 
are not even worth recording. 
The police persist in the practice of extrajudicial execution of alleged armed robbers 
even when it is clear that “people are likely to be wrongly processed or detained as armed 
robbers.”238 For instance, in an expert criminological study of the use of armed robbery 
in the states of southeastern Nigeria, Smart Egwu Otu found evidence that victims “were 
roped into the crime (of armed robbery) as a result of family feud.”239 In his report fol-
lowing his mission to Nigeria in 2005, UN Special Rapporteur Phillip Alston observed:
  While armed robbery does plague much of Nigeria, the label of “armed robber” is very often 
used to justify the jailing and/or extrajudicial execution of innocent individuals who have 
come to the attention of the police for reasons ranging from a refusal to pay a bribe to insult-
ing or inconveniencing the police. There is reason to doubt that the 2,402 armed robbers 
killed since 2000 were in reality all armed robbers, much less that they were all killed in 
shoot-outs.240
Even the federal government of Nigeria admits that the police do indeed improp-
erly identify some—possibly many—of their victims as “armed robbers.” On December 
17, 2005, in the wake of the Apo Six murders, then Minister for Police Affairs Alaowei 
Broderick Bozimo placed paid announcements in major Nigerian newspapers which 
read, in part:241 
  It will be recalled that between the 7th and the 8th of June, 2005, we recorded a most bizarre 
encounter between some officers of the Nigeria Police Force and six youths at Gimbiya Street, 
Abuja. The incident culminated in the brutal killing of six civilians by the Police. On behalf 
of the Nigeria Police, Ministry of Police Affairs, and Federal Government, I offer my sincere 
condolences to the families of the deceased for the unfortunate Apo Six incident. . . . Govern-
ment has resolved, inter alia, as follows:
   (i) that contrary to the earlier misinformation that the Apo Six victims were armed 
robbers, incontrovertible evidence shows that they were NOT ARMED ROBBERS. 
Government, therefore, exonerates the victims and apologizes to their families and 
in fact all Nigerians through this medium.
The statement came more than six months after the incident in question and only 
after the Justice Goodluck Commission recommended the prosecution of all the officers 
involved. Criminal proceedings for murder were instituted in June 2006 but the officers 
involved were granted bail—an extraordinary measure in Nigeria, where homicide cases 
are not bailable—in August 2006 and since then the case has stalled.242 
Alleged robbery suspects may suffer an exceptionally high probability of sum-
mary execution in the hands of the NPF; however, they are not the only people killed 
by the police. In just one example, Babagana Zanna, a 17-year-old boy, was arrested and 
detained by NPF officers from Bulunkutu Police Station in Maiduguri, Borno State, on 
February 18, 2006, in connection with religious riots that took place in Maiduguri on 
the same day. Two days later, a fellow detainee smuggled out a message to the family 
that Zanna was dead. While preparing his body for burial according to Muslim practice, 
the family discovered a six-inch nail in his head. They concluded that the nail was driven 
into his head while in police detention, probably while under interrogation. 
Research conducted by NOPRIN for this report found that “wasting operations” 
are carried out by State Anti-Robbery Squads (SARS) and State Criminal Investigation 
Divisions (SCIDs) in all states of Nigeria. The Lagos SCID in Yaba (better known as 
Panti Police Station) and the Adeniji-Adele Police Station in Lagos Island are particularly 
notorious for such violations. In Anambra State, the Ogidi Police Station, Area Com-
mand Police Station in Awka, and Central Police Station in Onitsha are all similarly 
notorious. So are the Dobeli and Area Command Police Stations in Yola, Adamawa 
State; Gabasawa and Tudun Wada Stations in Kaduna State; Gwagwarwa, No-Man’s 
Land, and Zaria Road Police Stations in Kano State; Mapo and Iyangaku Police Stations 
in Ibadan, Oyo State; and Katako and Nasarawa Police Stations in Jos, Plateau State. 
A Hopeless Task: Counting the Dead 
Counting the number of people killed by the police in Nigeria is a hopeless task: there 
are simply too many, scattered over too large a geographic area, for outside monitors 
to measure accurately. For example, a witness told NOPRIN investigators that during 
the seven days he was detained at the SCID in Panti, Lagos in May 2005, he counted 15 
bodies executed and disposed of from the station. Police sources who spoke to NOPRIN 
researchers in Lagos corroborated this account, stating that in an average week 12 sus-
pected robbers are killed at the SCID in Panti alone. They also disclosed that regular 
executions occurred on a smaller scale at the area commands in Ikeja, Ogba, FESTAC 
territory, and SARS Ikeja. Another detainee held between June and July 2006 in the 
SARS cells in Awka, Anambra State, reported that an average of four detainees died 
every day from torture, summary executions, or subhuman conditions. 
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The evidence suggests that the NPF does not keep adequate records of killings 
committed by its personnel. Instead, data on police killings are deliberately manipulated 
to produce artificially low numbers. In April 2004, then Inspector-General of Police 
Tafa Balogun informed Human Rights Watch researchers that the NPF killed 7,198 
“armed robbers” from January 2000 to March 2004.243 This represents an average offi-
cial monthly killing rate of 141.1, or an average daily killing rate of about 4.6 persons 
per day. For the same period, however, Balogun’s successor, Sunday Ehindero, reported 
much different statistics in a July 2006 letter to the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-
judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. In this letter, Ehindero claimed that in the 
five years from 2000 through 2004, the N igeria Police Force killed 2,402 and arrested 
another 20,314 “armed robbers,” representing an inexplicable difference of 4,796 kill-
ings between Balogun’s figures and Ehindero’s.244 
In November 2007, Human Rights Watch estimated that the NPF killed over 
10,000 people in the eight years spanning 2000 through 2007.245 As shocking as 
that number may be, evidence gathered in the preparation of this report suggests that 
HRW’s estimate may be low. In 2004 alone, the Legal Defence and Aid Project docu-
mented 2,987 cases of extrajudicial executions by law enforcement agencies.246 This is 
roughly consistent with the most recent official police claims. In November 2007, Act-
ing Inspector-General Mike Okiro reported that the police had killed 785 and arrested 
1,628 “armed robbers” in his first one hundred days as IGP.247 This translates into a 
daily killing rate of 7.85 persons and a yearly rate of 2,865 police killings.248 Okiro’s 
figures also represent a kill-to-arrest ratio of 1:2.07. 
In comparison to the statistics announced by former Inspector-General Ehindero 
in 2000, Okiro’s data present an increase of over 400 percent in the official statistics for 
police killings. The inconsistencies in the official figures strongly suggest that deaths in 
police custody or encounters are not addressed with sufficient gravity and that records 
of such deaths are either nonexistent or very poorly kept. 
The total number of police killings admitted by Okiro for the three months pre-
ceding November 2007 exceeds the annual total for any of the seven years from 2000 
to 2006 as admitted by former Inspector-General Ehindero. This suggests either that 
the police under-counted the number of killings in the years 2000–2006 or that there 
was an alarming escalation in police killings in 2007. It also suggests that the NPF 
does not track killings by police accurately, and that the records are easily manipulated. 
Regardless of which estimate one accepts, it is clear that police killings are alarmingly 
regular and pervasive. 
In addition to those summarily executed by police, many other detainees die 
outside of police custody from injuries sustained during police torture, according to 
investigations conducted for this report. For instance, ex-detainee Ifezina died in late 
2005, several days after being released from the Garki Police Station in Abuja, where he 
endured prolonged torture that included the repeated insertion of unsterilized needles 
into his urinary tract.249 NOPRIN researchers documented a similar story in Kano. 
Umar Hussaini, a commercial motorbike operator, was arrested and detained on or 
about March 21, 2007 by men of the Dala Police Division, where he had gone to report 
his motorbike had been stolen. When Hussaini’s family visited the police station with 
food for Hussaini the following day, the police informed them that he had vomited after 
drinking and that was taken to Murtala Mohammed Specialist Hospital Kano. When the 
family located Hussaini in the emergency section of the hospital, major bones in his 
arms and torso were broken, he was in severe pain, drifting in and out of conscious-
ness, and unable to speak. Hussaini died early on March 23 from his injuries. Other 
ex-detainees leave police detention with injuries so severe that they suffer physical pain 
and are handicapped for the rest of their lives. There is no way to estimate the numbers 
of such victims. 
No Resting Place: Disposing of the Dead
Police personnel have developed elaborate protocols to cover up summary executions 
and other detainee deaths in custody. Staff of the Lagos State University Teaching Hos-
pital informed NOPRIN researchers that “the police no longer bring dead bodies that 
they kill here. They now throw them in the lagoon.” Police sources in Onitsha, Anam-
bra State, similarly alleged that victims of extrajudicial killing are also thrown into the 
nearby River Niger, often at the dead of the night.
In other cases, researchers learned that the police would allow a victim’s body to 
begin decomposing before delivering it for post-mortem. This practice is used to create 
the maximum inconvenience for medical examiners, making it more difficult to deter-
mine the cause of death and forcing them to hurry a death certificate without adequate 
examination. The aim of the police, it seems, is to facilitate the quick removal of the 
bodies for mass burial, even without identification of the victims. 
Sources at the University of Nigeria Teaching Hospital’s mortuary alleged that 
police personnel brought corpses to deposit at the mortuary at least once a week: “Most 
have gunshot wounds but there are also those who might have been killed by vehicle 
accident.” According to these sources:
  The police do not give us names of the victims since, according to them, they were killed 
during fire engagements [sic]. They register their names as armed robbery suspects. Then 
they dump them here and leave.  Sometimes they bring in three, four or even eight corpses. 
Since the police don’t drop money for embalmment the body starts to decompose after two 
days. Sometimes we send the corpses to Anatomy Department for educational purposes. We 
normally ask the local government to come and remove the corpses for mass burial.250 
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Many police stations fail to keep adequate records of their detainees and suspects, 
making it easier to execute them and dispose of their bodies. Victims’ relatives who 
spoke with NOPRIN researchers in all the states covered by this report told of being 
denied the opportunity to bury their loved ones. Others reported having to pay signifi-
cant bribes in order to retrieve the bodies for burial. 
The NPF’s culture of cover-ups is also facilitated by a dearth of forensic skills in 
the Nigerian medical profession. An independent review (commissioned for this report) 
of the role of Nigeria’s medical profession in extrajudicial police killings concluded that 
“the police have found a compliant and uncaring Nigerian medical profession and have, 
therefore, found it unnecessary to intimidate or coerce doctors into complying.”251 The 
police often deposit the remains of their victims in public mortuaries, claiming the 
deaths resulted from fatal traffic accidents or listing the victims as an “unknown armed 
robbery suspect.” These classifications are routinely reproduced by the attending medi-
cal examiners, even when a cover-up is obvious. As staff of the State Specialist Hospital 
in Yola told one of the report’s investigators in May 2007: 
  When the police bring corpses like that, there is a way we know if the deaths are from their 
hand. ... When we are preparing bodies for embalming and you see traces of severe beating or 
bullets lodged in the legs or people who simply die because of starvation and maltreatment, 
you don’t need to go far. 
VII. Police Torture: “Cruel, 
 Outrageous, and Malicious 
 Conduct”
Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution prohibits torture but fails to define what torture is. Violence 
and torture are intrinsic to the way the Nigeria Police Force conducts its work, and are 
found at every point of contact between the public and police—from routine checks 
through arrest, interrogation, and detention. This violence has been described as “insti-
tutional and routine.”252 It is also often indiscriminate, casual, and unprovoked. Accord-
ing to one source, this “gratuitous violence has the effect of intimidating the suspect 
and weakening or, in some cases, even breaking whatever spirit he has even before the 
proper interrogation process,”253 thus making the detainee more than likely to comply 
with the biddings of the police—including signing a false confession. 
The average police officer on the streets of Nigeria is armed with horse whip and 
many of them show considerable enthusiasm in using it on innocent passersby without 
provocation. Those who get away with merely being horsewhipped are considered lucky. 
Many others fare much worse. In the case of Ifeanyi Anyanor v. Commissioner of Police 
Delta State & 3 Others, Anyanor—a trader in automobiles—his brother, and his aged 
mother were arrested by the police on a complaint by a customer with whom Anyanor 
had a civil dispute. The family was taken to the State Police Headquarters in Asaba, 
Delta State, where the investigating police officer and another NPF officer, identified as 
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Sergeant Henry Emefiele, “assaulted the Applicant with horse whip and with a clenched 
fist, inflicted blows on the Applicant’s eye causing him injuries,” which “resulted in 
redness of the eye, periorbital swelling, headaches/body aches and swelling, with sub-
conjunctiva hemorrhage in the right eye.”254 After beating Anyanor, Sergeant Emefiele 
returned him to the cell where he hand-cuffed and chained him overnight. The High 
Court of Delta State described the conduct of the police in this case as “flagrant disre-
gard of the law ... cruel, outrageous and malicious conduct.”255 Most police officers and 
detainees readily testify that such conduct is routine. 
The “O/C Torture” 
While police in Nigeria may commit torture for several reasons, by far the most com-
mon is the desire to break the spirit of the suspect or detainee. As described in Chapter 
IV, the NPF lacks the capacity or inclination to conduct evidence-based investiga-
tions, instead relying on confessions that are often obtained through torture. NOPRIN 
researchers found an elaborate system of torture exists to serve this goal. Torture facili-
ties and personnel, including dedicated torture chambers, instruments, and an officer 
known as “O/C (officer in charge of ) Torture” exist in every major police station. In 
most cases, the O/C Torture has a workshop or torture chamber entirely of his own, 
and a seemingly limitless number of options for dispensing suffering and eliciting the 
confessions that are the principal means of police investigation in Nigeria. Some of 
them achieve near-legendary status. 
In Enugu, for instance, researchers were told about Superintendent of Police 
Sunday Maicibi, the head of the SCID anti-robbery section, who is legendary for his 
dexterity in breaking suspects and extracting confessions. Many ex-detainees at the 
anti-robbery section narrated harrowing experiences of torture at the hands of Maicibi 
and his men. The torture chamber at the SCID headquarters in Enugu is so famous 
(or infamous) that it is known as “the theatre.” Also at the SCID in Enugu, detainees 
speak with dread about a police officer known called “Okpontu”—meaning “the Nailer” 
in Igbo language—after he reportedly drove a nail through the palm of a detainee 
in 2006. 
The expert assessment of police torture commissioned for this report found many 
different methods of torture, including:
• beatings, which are often severe in nature and may be directed at certain parts 
of the body such as the head or genitals, and which may involve several officers 
even if the suspect is not resisting; 
• beatings and other cruel treatment administered by fellow detainees, often as 
ordered by the police;
• forced gymnastics including frog jumping, prolonged standing, and forced stress 
positions aimed at humiliating or physically exhausting the victim;
• tear gas or pepper spray which may be directed at the eyes and nose or, in female 
detainees, at the genitalia;
• clubbing of the soles of the feet and/or the ankles;
• slapping of one or both ears with a cupped hand, which can rupture the victim’s 
eardrums;
• banging the victim’s head against the wall or floor;
• burning the victim with cigarettes, hot irons, or flame;
• squeezing or crushing of fingers, ripping out finger or toe nails or inserting sharp 
objects under the nail;
• suspending the victim off the floor by the wrists and or ankles, usually supple-
mented with flogging;
• exposing the victim to climatic stress, including cold, damp cells or brutally hot 
ones;
• exposing the victim to mosquitoes, flies, roaches, spiders, rats, and snakes, know-
ing that these can induce a phobia in many people;
• asphyxiating the victim through submersion in water;
• sexual torture through rape, including sexual violation using objects such as bot-
tles and broomsticks;
• mental torture, including threats made to the detainee or his loved ones and mock 
executions;
• non-therapeutic administration of drugs including pain-inducing drugs or threat-
ening injection with dangerous drugs or HIV;
• psychological manipulation, including promising to end the torture if victims 
cooperate, or offering drinks and cigarettes, better prison conditions, or the 
removal of handcuffs where applicable;
• sleep deprivation;
• denial of needed medical treatment;
• starvation and/or deprivation of water;
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• constant interrogation
• shooting both legs, known as the “V.I.P. treatment.”
This list is not exhaustive. Several of these methods are commonly used in com-
bination.256 
Making Them Crawl
Although NPF personnel use many different methods of torture, they all have in com-
mon the suffering and humiliation that victims experience. One way the police achieve 
this is by disabling the legs or ankles of detainees through shooting or repeated beat-
ing. Many interviewees reported that armed robbery suspects are often shot in the legs 
before interrogation; after the interrogation, they are executed. Thus the corpses of 
many alleged armed robbers deposited by the police in public mortuaries (and exam-
ined by NOPRIN researchers) bore clear evidence of gunshot injuries in the lower 
limbs. 
Suspects who are not executed are routinely made to crawl out of the station or 
into court. On October 12, 2004, for instance, Lawal Yahuza crawled on his bottom sup-
ported by his hands into the Magistrates Court in Maitama, Abuja, to be arraigned on 
charges of stealing. Both ankles had allegedly been broken by officers of the Maitama 
Police Station who beat him repeatedly with batons and iron rods. The trial magistrate 
did not investigate why the suspect crawled into court. 
Abdullahi Ibrahim Kura, a political activist, was arrested and detained with tens 
of other activists on the complaint of the local leader of another faction of his party, 
the Peoples’ Salvation Party, at the Karfi Police Post in Kano on or about September 28, 
2006. About his experience at the police station, Kura stated as follows:
  I was taken to Karfi Police outpost and was later thoroughly beaten by a policeman called 
Aminu, alias “Ribadu.” [He] used a metal bar thicker than an iron rod—more like a police 
baton—to hit me all over my joints for almost one hour—particularly my knees and legs to 
the extent I couldn’t stand up on my feet. He then asked me to stand up and I told him I 
couldn’t. After he became satisfied that I couldn’t stand he then asked me to crawl to the 
cell. This was around 11:00 p.m. That night I couldn’t sleep. The following day at around 
9:15 a.m. he came back with a paper and pen but before he did anything he used that same 
metal to beat me again all over my body including my head this time around.257
For three nights thereafter, Ribadu ordered Kura and his co-detainees to crawl 
out onto the public area of the police compound, forced them to squat (knowing that 
they could not do this on their incapacitated ankles) and do a sequence of frog jumps. 
Ribadu then required the detainees to shout repeatedly in the Hausa language: “we are 
the children of villagers, who are irresponsible, poor, and useless!” Hobbled by pain, 
the detainees were repeatedly beaten for their inability to jump on incapacitated ankles. 
During each of these sessions, Ribadu would telephone Alhaji Shehu, the party leader 
who had engineered the arrests, and put the phone on speaker “to have him hear our 
agonized cries and raining insults and abusive words to our parents by ourselves.”258 On 
or about October 3, 2006, Ribadu fetched buckets of mud which he forced the detainees 
to rub over their bodies. He then required each of them to pay a fine of N1,000, and 
proceeded to drive them in a Toyota Hilux to the Kura Police Station in Kano where the 
detainees were finally granted bail. 
A Dictionary of Suffering: From “Suicide” to the 
“Third Degree”
Torture by NPF personnel is so commonplace—and the methods so varied —that 
NOPRIN researchers learned that the police have invented a whole lexicon for differ-
ent forms of torture, including “J5,” “freeze-up,” “third degree,” and “suicide.” The “J5” 
involves sleep deprivation in a prolonged standing position occasioning painful swelling 
in the lower limbs. This sometimes results in detainees collapsing or passing out from 
exhaustion or other releated health complications. During a “suicide,” the detainee is 
suspended at the end of a rope tied to the ankles with the head down, legs in the air 
and hands often tied or manacled behind the back. The officer administering the tor-
ture determines how long the detainee stays in this position and whether or not this 
is accompanied by additional beating or other forms of pain. The High Court of Delta 
State has specifically declared the “suicide” to be a constitutionally prohibited form of 
torture.259 Notwithstanding this decision, researchers found that the practice continues 
unabated within the NPF. 
In one instance, a detainee named Ifezina died after being administered a 
“suicide” at the Garki Police Station in Abuja during which the police also inserted 
needles into his genitals.260 In February 2006, an alleged armed robber named Jude 
John reportedly received the “suicide” at the SCID headquarters in Jos. In an interview 
with NOPRIN researchers in March 2007, John reported how he was suspended from 
the hook of a ceiling fan by his ankles while his hands were handcuffed behind him 
with what he called a “Chinese handcuff.”261 In this position, according to John, he 
was beaten by the police with an electric cable. Researchers found visible lacerations 
and scars on his chest and back. His forefingers were very sw ollen and missing the 
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fingernails, which appeared to have been ripped out. His hobbling, John explained, was 
due to the dislocation of his left kneecap during torture at the SCID in Jos. 
The “third-degree” combines different elements of physical constriction into what 
many victims report to be a uniquely excruciating experience. It has been described as 
follows:
  The victim is made to lie face down. His legs are then folded upwards at the knees and tied 
together at the ankles, and his arms are raised upwards and tied together at the wrists. A pipe 
or rod, attached at its ends to a rope hanging from [a] hook in the ceiling, is passed between 
both legs and both arms. The suspect is raised towards the ceiling by pulling at the loose 
end of the rope until suspended in the air in the form of a human bow. This position soon 
generates excruciating pain all over the body but particularly in the shoulders, the spine, and 
the waist. While the suspect is yet suffering this pain, the interrogating officer subjects him 
to beating with horsewhips, batons, wire cables, or other instruments.262 
Tropicalized German Cells 
Contrary to the express prohibitions in Nigeria’s Constitution, the police use both pro-
longed detention and abysmal cell conditions as deliberate instruments of torture. Nige-
ria’s 1999 Constitution requires that suspects should be arraigned, where there is a 
court of competent jurisdiction within a radius of forty kilometers, within 24 hours of 
arrest or “in any other case, a period of two days or such longer period as in the circum-
stances may be considered by the court to be reasonable.”263 Yet, the police routinely 
detain suspects well beyond this constitutionally mandated duration. Explaining the 
habitual resort to prolonged police detention in March 2005, the then Kogi State Com-
missioner of Police disclosed that “if you put a suspect in detention for two weeks ... 
that may be enough to bring him down and confess or provide you with useful informa-
tion.”264 In March 2007, when informed that detainees—constitutionally presumed to 
be innocent—should not be subject to such treatment, a police officer in Yola, Adamawa 
State, retorted: 
  Who told you they are innocent!? You people don’t know anything. You just talk. Do you know 
what we see here? We have seen pastors, imams, and highly placed and respected citizens 
who are pure criminals, pure criminals! And you people say they are innocent? 
In the case of Chiziri Nice v. Attorney General of the Federation, evidence emerged 
that detainees were made to “lie on top of another detainee inside the police van, beaten 
thoroughly, and taken to Garki 2 Police Station, Abuja, where they were locked up with 
more than 30 persons in one cell.”265 In Lagos, researchers discovered that some police 
stations maintain special punishment cells known as “German cells,” where congestion 
is specifically deployed as a mechanism of torture:266 
  These cells are usually extremely narrow and have a ventilation hole that … only allows a thin 
stream of light. The Police stuff these narrow enclosures with so many inmates that they only 
barely have enough room in which to stand. The press of bodies is so great that many weaker 
inmates faint from the pressure and heat. In all cases, the heat and stench … is suffocating. 
It is into these German cells that the Police often put detainees undergoing interrogation.267
At SARS in Awka, Anambra State, researchers uncovered a similar practice. The 
SARS in Awka maintain three cells: Cell 1, Cell 2, and a cell for female prisoners. Cell 
2, which is bigger than Cell 1, is reportedly the size of an average jail cell and regularly 
holds over sixty detainees. Cell 1 usually holds over 80 detainees, and has no roof. It 
is used as a transitional holding space: exceptionally ill prisoners or prisoners who are 
suspected to be on the verge of death are kept there so that they can get some air from 
outside. Detainees report daily deaths at the SARS cells, due to the conditions of deten-
tion alone. For instance, police from SARS Awka arrested and detained Uche Abiakalam 
of Okpoko, Anambra State, and seven others in these cells for 93 days starting on July 
26, 2006. As Abiakalam recounted to NOPRIN researchers, during this time four of 
his co-detainees died from the torture and inhumane cell conditions. By Abiakalam’s 
estimate, an average of four detainees died daily in the SARS cells. 
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VIII. Rape and Sexual Assault 
 by the Police
Rape and sexual abuse—especially of female suspects and detainees—is a routine but 
unspoken aspect of policing in Nigeria. The report of the second Presidential Commit-
tee on Police Reform in 2008 acknowledged rape to be one of the “forms police bru-
tality” committed by personnel of the NPF.268 Reflecting on this reality in an article in 
January 2009, respected columnist Dr. Reuben Abati pointed out that “the big scandal 
is that the police are not interested in prosecuting rapists. The police station itself is a 
rape centre ... We have a country where it is risky for a woman to be detained overnight 
in any police station.”269 Sometimes, police rape results in pregnancy. In November 
2008, a leading Nigerian newspaper, Saturday Vanguard, published the report of an 
investigation alleging that the police had impregnated ten female police detainees.270 
According to the report:
  Members of the Nigerian police force secretly abuse, rape and forcefully have sex with 
inmates of Nigerian detention facilities, some female prisoners serving various prison terms 
have alleged. To this end, many children born by the inmates are largely unclaimed, and the 
women, though some know the fathers of their kids, many of them do not.
In November 2006, Amnesty International issued a report alleging that “rape 
by police and security forces [in Nigeria] is endemic, and that the government appears 
to lack the political will to tackle this human rights issue.”271 In Rest in Pieces, Human 
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Rights Watch reported “several incidents of rape of and other sexual violence against 
female detainees” by personnel of the Nigeria Police Force.272 The leadership of the 
police appears to be aware of this pattern of police behavior. In response to allegations 
of sexual abuse committed by the Nigerian contingent of the United Nations Observer 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Civilian Police Unit, then Force Pub-
lic Relations Officer and Deputy Commissioner of Police Haz Iwendi said: “these are 
typical Nigerian police. They went there and instead of doing the job they were sent to 
do, they started abusing little girls and raping women.”273 
In Nigeria, victims of rape have few incentives to report the crime. They face social 
and cultural pressures to refrain from bringing shame to their families by going on 
record with their ordeal. The police lack both the skills and sensitivity to investigate this 
most intrusive of crimes. Victims lack access to medical, psychological, and emotional 
support services. Where rape is perpetrated by the police, the victims additionally face 
real threats of intimidation or reprisal if they report their experience to the authorities. 
In 2006, Amnesty International reported the abduction and rape of two female 
students, aged 17 and 18-years-old at the time of the attack, by two NPF officers in 
Enugu. The two students narrated how, on September 27, 2004, they were abducted and 
subsequently raped by two police officers, including a deputy superintendent of police, 
while returning home from the market: “We begged him to let us go, but the policeman 
said he would arrest us. When we refused to get into the car, the other man pushed us 
inside.” Threatened with arrest on trumped-up charges if they protested, the victims 
were forced to go with the police officers to the premises of the Police Detective College 
in Enugu. They were subsequently taken to the home of one of the men, having been 
told that they would be safer there than in custody, and repeatedly raped: 
  A detective colleague came into the house, he smelled of alcohol ... I don’t know what hap-
pened; he said he doesn’t have money. He asked me for money for drink, [but] I said [I] have 
no money. He reassured me he won’t harm me. Then [the] man’s face changed. He said he 
won’t do any harm. I was crying but [he] told [me] to be quiet. He said it’s final. He can shoot 
us. I was crying and before I knew it I was pushed inside [the] room. He shouted “shut up” 
and said we should take off our clothes. He took out a gun and showed us the bullets, and 
pulled off his clothes. He raped me three times. Afterwards I was crying and he looked for 
fuel to take us back. It was around midnight we were brought to other men who raped us 
too as payment for the petrol.274 
In preparing this report, researchers uncovered similar credible allegations of 
police rape and the absence of any effective means of redress, notably in Abia, Anambra, 
Enugu, Kaduna, Kano, and Lagos States. (The victims spoke only on condition of 
anonymity, saying that underlying social and customary attitudes and fear of the NPF 
precluded them from publicly admitting that they had been raped while in police 
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custody.) The NPF keeps no records of—and has a practice of denying—incidents of 
rape by its personnel. In all states in which the report’s researchers posed the question, 
the leadership of the police reported that they had received no reports of rape against 
police personnel. In Enugu State, Amnesty International reported at the end of 2006 
that the then commissioner of police claimed that “rape by Police has not happened.”275 
The case of Queen Okoye illustrates the brutal glibness of police denials and the 
unavailability of redress for victims. Okoye had gone to the police area G. Ogba, near 
Ikeja in Lagos State in 2008 to report the alleged theft by her boyfriend of N30,000 
belonging to her. Rather than address her complaint, the police allegedly kept her in the 
station until after dark, when several men of the unit gang-raped Okoye. As a result of 
the rape she became pregnant. When Okoye reported her experience to police authori-
ties, she received no response. When she subsequently took her protest to the police 
hierarchy in January 2009, they accused her of being mentally unstable.276 
Notwithstanding such obstacles and denials, NOPRIN researchers uncovered sev-
eral credible accounts of rape by the police. In one such case, in March 2007, at about 
9 p.m., a team of plainclothes police arrested 14-year-old Miss K. at Asipa Street near 
her residence in Iyana Orile, Agege, Lagos State.277 She was on her way to buy bread 
for her family. According to Miss K.: 
  I was sent on an errand from my house at Elegbede Street to Asipa Street, at Iyana Orile 
Agege, when I was arrested by some plainclothes policemen. They didn’t tell me my offense. 
They just pushed me inside one Danfo bus. Inside the Danfo, I met some people, both young 
and old. We were driven to Elere Police Station and locked inside one cell. At the station, 
other people were released, one by one except three of us.
    Around midnight, one man called “Spirit” [later revealed to be NPF Corporal Olayinka 
Williams] called me from the window of the cell and promised to help me secure a place to 
sleep for the night. He then took me inside a vehicle. I thought he was taking me home but 
I was surprised to find myself in a strange environment. I asked where we were, and he said 
it was Ogba and he lived near the place. I followed him inside. He locked the door and drew 
the curtains. He brought a pillow for me and I slept off. Suddenly I started feeling strange 
hands caressing my body and I saw him lying beside me. He threatened to take me back 
to the cell. I would have shouted but he pulled a gun and threatened to shoot me if I did. I 
started crying. He then raped me. Blood started oozing out of my private part. I have never 
done such a thing in my life.
Miss K.’s father, Tunde O., took his daughter to Oke-Odo General Hospital where it 
was confirmed that she had suffered sexual assault. He lodged a formal complaint at the 
station and Miss K. identified Corporal Olayinka Williams, in an identity parade, as the 
perpetrator. Corporal Williams has been relieved of his duties and awaits prosecution. 
A practice that is reported to be common in several parts of the Lagos Police 
Command is for male police officers to demand sex from female detainees as the price 
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for bail. For example, in December 2006 police at the Ikoyi Police Station in Lagos 
arrested and detained a 23-year-old female domestic worker at the instigation of her 
employer for alleged theft of money. In the dead of the night, male police personnel 
pretending to be helping her in reviewing her case took her out to the back of the police 
station where they raped her before letting her go.278 Victims interviewed by Saturday 
Vanguard for its November 15, 2008, report into the practice of police sexual abuse of 
female detainees alleged that:
  In the night, some policemen on night duties would be telling us to allow them to have some 
rounds of sex with us. They would be telling us that in the morning, they would help us so 
that we will be free. We have no choice other than to give, hoping that they would help us to 
be let off the hook in the morning.279
The public health consequences of sexual abuse of detainees by the police are 
difficult to measure and have not yet been investigated. Lasting physical injury and 
psychological trauma are obvious as is the associated incidence of unwanted pregnan-
cies. This form of high risk criminal behavior is clearly a vector for sexually transmitted 
infections, including HIV/AIDS. Yet the NPF does not provide any HIV/AIDS aware-
ness training to its personnel nor does it have any police measures to prevent or ensure 
accountability for sexual abuse of detainees.
A male detainee arrested and detained at the FCID in Abuja in August 2006 nar-
rated how an investigating police officer (IPO) allegedly impregnated a female detainee. 
According to the detainee, several male police officers were in the habit of taking the 
detainee out of the cell at night and having unprotected sex with her without her con-
sent. She subsequently fell ill and started showing the symptoms of pregnancy, includ-
ing vomiting and general weakness. The female detainee was taken to the hospital for 
a test where it was confirmed that she was some weeks pregnant. On interrogation, she 
named the IPO, who was later arrested and detained. The police allegedly kept the case 
quiet by releasing the female detainee unconditionally.280
In one instance recounted to NOPRIN researchers, two sisters, Edith and Pauline 
were arrested in July 2005 by men of Area G Police Station, Ogba, Lagos on suspicion 
of assault following a fight with a female co-tenant.281 At the police station, the IPO 
advised them that in order to secure their release, they would have to oblige him with 
sex. According to the sisters, they remained jailed for one week and each night the IPO 
would take one of them into the back of the police station where he repeatedly raped 
them. 
Rape by Any Means
Field monitoring conducted for this report found that sexual violence is used routinely 
by officers of the NPF as an interrogation technique. In June 2006, police in Minna, 
Niger State, arrested Njideka Uzendu as a suspect in the alleged robbery of her friend 
Esther Nwaokoye. Uzendu, in the company of another friend, Chidinma, had visited 
Nwaokoye. Two days after their visit, robbers allegedly raided Nwaokoye’s residence, 
carting away most of her belongings. In reporting the incident to the SCID in Minna, 
Nwaokoye mentioned her friend Uzendu as the prime suspect. Acting on this com-
plaint, and without investigation, the police arrested and detained Uzendu.282
After spending the first night in a cell, Uzendu was taken into the interrogation 
room for questioning on the orders of a female chief superintendent of police known 
as Chinyere. Under Chinyere’s supervision, Uzendu’s police interrogators repeatedly 
hit her head against the wall, tore her clothes, including her bra, and threatened her 
with death if she did not admit to the allegation. The police used Uzendu’s torn bra 
to gag her and her torn clothes to tie her hands behind her back. The police also tore 
off Uzendu’s pants, leaving her naked. At this stage, Chinyere ordered that Uzendu be 
taken to the toilet, where her head was forced into the toilet bowl while the toiled was 
flushed. NPF officers then dragged her across the floor back to the interrogation room. 
A police officer allegedly smashed Uzendu’s face with an iron rod, opening a deep 
cut and knocking her unconscious. Uzendu gradually regained consciousness in the 
interrogation room and found that Nwaokoye, the complainant, had entered the room 
and was—on Chinyere’s instruction—spreading Uzendu’s legs and preparing to insert 
the iron rod into her vagina. Uzendu used the little strength she had left to resist the 
insertion, but still sustained bruises to her genital region. The police detained Uzendu 
for five more days without medical attention before she was released on the orders of 
Assistant Commissioner of Police Patrick Ajah.283 
Following her ordeal, Uzendu was admitted to the IBB Specialist Hospital in 
Minna, where the medical director, Dr. Mahmud Mohammed, confirmed that Uzendu 
had injuries to the left frontal region of her face, chest wall, upper limbs, thighs, knees, 
and genitals. She also sustained a sub-conjunctiva hemorrhage in her left eye. In July 
2006, Uzendu’s lawyer, Benjamin Adokwu, petitioned the IGP and the Police Service 
Commission to conduct an investigation. At the time this report was written the PSC 
had yet to act on the petition and the police authorities could only confirm that they had 
received the case and were still investigating the complaint. 
In a similar case, Nwanneka284 narrated to NOPRIN researchers her experience 
at the SCID in Enugu in May 2002. She was initially arrested with two other females 
by officers of the Ninth Mile Police Station on the outskirts of Enugu on charges of 
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assisting an armed robbery suspect, before being transferred to the SCID on May 
3, 2002. After taking the statements of the female detainees, NPF Inspector Friday 
Iyamabo ordered them detained in the cells of the SCID. He later reportedly returned 
to the cell with pepper spray and powdered chili pepper, ordered the female detainees 
to strip and one after the other applied the mixture of pepper spray and chili to their 
genitals after severely beating them with batons. The detainees were denied access to 
medical treatment. Five years after this experience, Nwanneka reported to NOPRIN 
researchers in April 2007 that, as a result of this experience, she continues to suffer 
from complications with both her reproductive system and urinary tract.285
In another case, researchers learned that in November 2005, Queen286 was 
arrested by police from Monitoring Unit, State Command, Ikeja, for suspected armed 
robbery, along with her boyfriend. The arresting police unit detained her for a fortnight. 
While in detention, Queen reported that the IPO, a policewoman, inserted metal rods 
into her vagina during interrogation, causing her serious injuries.
Sometimes, the police arrange for victims to be raped by male detainees a s an 
act of reprisal or intimidation. In June 2005, Access to Justice reported the case of one 
Mrs. X, who was arrested after she threatened to raise an alarm when men of the Obal-
ende Police Station who had arrested and detained her husband failed to produce him. 
According to the report, “[t]he officer on duty arrested and threw her into an all-male 
cell, where she was repeatedly raped by the cell inmates until the next morning.”287
“Fringe Benefits:” When the Police Rape Sex Workers 
Perhaps the most pervasive form of rape and sexual violence by the police is commit-
ted against sex workers. According to a policeman attached to Ikeja Police Station, 
“this is one of the fringe benefits attached to night patrol.”288 Researcher Reuben Abati 
confirms this as follows: “[y]ou need to talk to prostitutes that stand by the roadside in 
Lagos. When the police arrest them every evening, they take them to the station and 
impose a punishment of free sex.”289 Field monitors found that in Lagos, police patrol 
teams target neighborhoods known to be frequented by sex workers such as Obalende, 
Ojuelegba, Ayilara, Allen Avenue, and the Empire Cinema area in Yaba. In Kaduna, the 
police usually raid Maiduguri Road, off Ahmadu Bello Way, which has been nicknamed 
“Obalende” after the well-known red-light district in Lagos. In Kano, the neighborhoods 
of Sabon-Gari are usually targeted for similar predatory raids.  
A typical scenario described to NOPRIN researchers goes like this: At about 10 
p.m., scores of sex workers and their patrons gather in a busy street usually close to a 
nightclub or a pub. Suddenly, a police patrol vehicle appears from nowhere. Commotion 
ensues as everyone flees. The unlucky ones are promptly arrested and pushed inside 
a police van or, in some cases, into a commercial vehicle commandeered by the police 
for the raid. They are told that they are being taken to the police station but they are not 
given a reason. Along the way the patrol van parks alongside the road. The police tell 
them they can “bail” themselves out by paying N2,000 each. Those who comply are set 
free. Those who are considered desireable by the police are given the option of buying 
their freedom by providing sex. Those who fail to pay—in one way or the other—are 
taken to the station and detained. 
Nnene, a sex worker at Allen Avenue who fell victim to this police practice on two 
occasions narrated her experience as follows: 
  I was hustling here in Allen last year, around June. At about 11 p.m. a police vehicle stopped. I 
was taken unawares. Four of us were caught. We were asked to enter the vehicle. There were 
two girls already inside the vehicle. They told us that we have committed a serious offense 
and would be taken to court the following day and jailed. We pleaded with them to release 
us since we were doing the job simply to survive. They refused. They took us to Area F Ikeja. 
Some of the girls gave them N2,000, some gave them N1,000 or N1,500. They were released. 
I was taken inside the building. I did not have any money on me. I was kept for about two 
hours. Later one of them came and asked me to follow him. He told me that since I did not 
have money I should give him “f__k” to bail myself. We went to the back where they have an 
abandoned vehicle and did it. He asked me to go without even saying “thank you.” 
Several sex workers in Lagos interviewed by NOPRIN researchers specifically 
named police from Area F, Ikeja, and Area G, Ogba, as some of the worst culprits in 
this practice. 
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IX. Extortion and Police-for-Hire 
Corruption and extortion are perhaps the defining characteristics associated with the 
NPF. For a majority of police officers, the police uniform is a tool for generating income. 
They make money by extorting law abiding citizens, claiming that it is the price people 
must pay to keep the police from gratuitously interfering with their livelihoods. The 
instances cited in this report merely illustrate a pattern of conduct that is pervasive and 
institutionalised within the NPF. The 2008 report of the second Presidential Commit-
tee on Police Reform acknowledges quite candidly that this is the image of the Nigerian 
police:
  Indeed the Police today is publicly perceived as one of the most corrupt government institu-
tions, with its personnel constantly accused of bribery and extortion in the course of perform-
ing their functions. These accusations are rampant amongst the populace, especially that 
relating to the extortion from members of the public. In addition, the Police have also been 
accused of erecting illegal road blocks in order to extort money from the citizenry. ... This 
has resulted in the loss of public confidence in the integrity of police personnel.290
Most police officers readily cite their poor pay as the principal reason for extortion. 
Some even claim that in the absence of basic provisions for policing, the police use the 
proceeds from extortion to fulfil operational needs, such as stationery for recording 
statements from suspects, gasoline for patrol vehicles, batteries for mobile phone units, 
and similar day-to-day needs. 
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Far from being an instrument for facilitating otherwise legitimate police opera-
tions, however, extortion in Nigeria is essentially a revenue stream and an instrument 
of power for NPF personnel. A typical experience of police extortion is narrated by an 
interstate truck driver who claims to have been stopped by the police at a checkpoint in 
Warri, Delta State, on October 19, 2007:
  Just before the Effurun roundabout, a Police officer stopped my vehicle. I parked. He asked 
for me particulars, which I gave him. After a long delay, he came back to me and said one of 
the papers—the Hackney permit—had expired three days earlier. I admitted and explained 
that a fresh one was being processed. But he would hear none of that. All attempts to per-
suade him to let me go failed. He eventually reported me to his boss, a man with the rank of 
an Inspector. I heard him being called Mr. Benjie S.O. by all the people around. The Boss, 
Mr. Benjie, himself insisted that I must settle with them before I will be allowed to go. They 
demanded N4,000 from me. I begged that I did not have any such amount on me but he 
would hardly listen. After a protracted time spent on begging and pleading, he asked how 
much I had, and I said N1,400, which he collected and insisted that I still owe them the 
N4,000 he asked for. I told him I will see him on my way back from Port Harcourt, but he 
did not believe me, and so he seized my [mobile phone] handset from me, asking that on my 
way back, they will give me my handset after I had paid the N4,000, irrespective of the fact 
that he had taken N1,400 earlier. . . . He collected my handset and made it very difficult for 
me to communicate with my office in Ibadan and even the owners of the goods I carried. I 
eventually caused some panic in the company since I could not be reached, neither could I 
reach anybody.291
Make Returns or Be Made Redundant
Research for this report revealed an organized scheme in the NPF under which senior 
officers expressly approve and profit from extortion committed by NPF personnel. In all 
the states covered by field research for this report, junior police personnel who spoke 
with NOPRIN researchers under guarantees of anonymity claimed that there is a stan-
dard practice: police personnel on certain beats are required to “deliver” certain amounts 
daily to their superiors, notably the Divisional Police Officers (DPO) and the Divisional 
Crime Officers (DCOs), or risk being transferred to non-lucrative duty posts. Police 
personnel on patrol are expected to deliver the highest amount. Failure to “deliver” or 
“make returns” could result in severe penalties, ranging from transfer to non-lucrative 
beats to being dismissed from the force.
Field monitors discovered that some geographic locations, such as Abuja, Anam-
bra, Delta, Lagos, and Rivers States, and some particular assignments such as the Ports 
Authority Police, are regarded as especially lucrative posts. It is not a secret that police 
officers routinely pay bribes of anywhere between N40,000 to N200,000 in order to 
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secure postings to these places—and then often must pay again to avoid being trans-
ferred out of these locations. The amount that must be paid depends on the rank and 
availability of positions in the desired location. Once they are in a position, those posted 
expect to reap rich returns on their investment. Within the state commands, smaller 
amounts of money are also paid by police personnel who desire to be posted to or not 
moved from the state capitals or other urban areas in the states. 
For the Right Price: There is Bail for Everything
It is impossible to fully describe the prevalence or patterns of extortion in the NPF as 
uncovered by this report’s researchers. Police-related corruption can be found in all 
corners of the country and ranges in size from small, opportunistic bribes demanded by 
a single officer to massive corruption schemes involving entire units. But regardless of 
their size, all such incidents are characterized by the use of the police uniform to extort 
money or goods from the Nigerian public. Posters hanging in police stations in Nigeria 
may claim that bail is free, but all detainees and their families know that police bail has 
a price tag which varies with location, the nature of the offense charged, the perceived 
wealth of the victim, and the degree of greed of the commanding police officers in the 
location where the case is reported.  
One example can be found in the case of Onyema Chukwuka of Federal Housing 
Estate, Kubwa, in Abuja. About 11 p.m. on March 17, 2007, three police officers walked 
up to him and demanded to know why he was found outside his house at such a time of 
the night. Chukwuka informed them that there was power outage which made the con-
ditions indoors inhospitable. In response, the officers retorted that he was not supposed 
to be outside his house at that time of the night and promptly told Chukwuka that he 
was under arrest. His request to know what crime he had committed went unanswered. 
When he tried to raise an alarm to alert his neighbors, two of the police officers pointed 
their guns at him and threatened to shoot him if he shouted. The officers handcuffed 
him and took him away. On this voyage to an unknown police station, one of the police 
officers asked Chukwuka how much money he could immediately provide as ransom 
for his freedom. Chukwuka offered the officers N2,000 and in return they removed the 
handcuffs and let him go. 
In another example, NOPRIN researchers learned of Samuel and Amil, two chil-
dren aged ten and nine respectively, who were arrested by men of the NPF in Karimo, 
Abuja, on the morning of January 3, 2007, for allegedly setting off celebratory New Years 
fireworks. Both children were detained “over-the-counter,” a colloquialism for being 
held in the reception area rather than in the police cells, at the Karimo Police Station 
until January 4, when they were released after their parents paid the police N5,000 each 
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for their “bail.” In Nigeria, Section 30 of the Criminal Code Act provides that “a person 
under the age of twelve years is not criminally responsible for an act or omission, unless 
it is proved that at the time of doing the act or making the omission he had capacity to 
know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission.” There was no such proof in 
this case nor was there any suggestion that the children had committed a crime—they 
simply provided the NPF with another opportunity for extortion. 
Sometimes, the police extort money from detainees as the price for saving them 
from extrajudicial execution or for reducing the intensity of torture. Kolawole Oladejo, 
an electrician on the staff of First Foundation Medical Engineering Company Limited, 
Opebi, Ikeja, Lagos State, was on duty on the night of March 17, 2005, when an armed 
robbery took place at the premises. During the operation, the robbers accosted and tied 
up the staff on duty, including Oladejo and all the four security officers on duty. The 
following morning, all five members of staff present during the robbery were taken 
away by men of the Area F Police Station, Ikeja, where they were initially granted bail 
upon payment of N10,000 each or a combined payment of N50,000. But on March 
23, the five were taken to the SCID in Panti, where they were told they faced charges of 
conspiracy and armed robbery. The IPO, one Sergeant Bitrus, demanded and received 
another N50,000 from the families of the detainees in order not to execute them and 
to reduce the torture. One of the detainees, Odeh, narrates:
  Torture began on March 29, (one day after the initial payment of N50,000 to Sgt. Bitrus) at 
about 4.30 p.m. and continued to about 8:30 p.m. Mr. Gagi, SARS boss, also supervised our 
torture. We were tied from behind, hands and legs together, then an iron was passed from the 
arms behind and was lifted by two of the police who assisted Bitrus and we were suspended 
for about an hour with two heavy stones placed at our back each. Since the very first day of 
our torture, some of us have not regained our health.292
It is not only individuals who have to be bailed out of police custody; researchers 
found that every item seized by the police also has to be “bailed” for a price. In Novem-
ber 2006, Abbas Adams hired a cab to take him and his newly-purchased household 
appliances—including a refrigerator and a television—home from the Alaba Interna-
tional Market in Ojo, Lagos State. At a police checkpoint not far from the market, three 
policemen intercepted Adams and asked for the receipts of the items, which he duly 
provided. The police personnel claimed that the receipts were forged. In response, 
Adams invited them to accompany him to the stalls from which he bought the goods, 
but police personnel insisted on taking him to their station. After failing to persuade 
the police to verify the authenticity of the receipts with the vendor, Adams agreed to go 
to station with them to see their DPO. At this juncture, one of the police personnel told 
him that they would take him to the station when they were through with the day’s work 
and told him that if he was not willing to wait, he should pay them N3,000 because, as 
one officer told him, “after using close to N90,000 to purchase those things you don’t 
expect us to eat receipts.” The police eventually accepted N1,500 from Adams before 
allowing him to go.
Those who are unable or unwilling to “bail” items unlawfully confiscated by police 
risk being arrested, detained, or arraigned on trumped up charges as well as losing the 
items that have been seized. Sunday Okoroafor was arrested in February 13, 2007, at 
Ijesha, Surulere, Lagos, as he was returning home from his father’s shop, carrying his 
laptop computer. According to Okoroafor, the police stopped him and asked for proof 
that he owned the laptop. Despite producing the receipt, Okoroafor was arrested and 
taken to Ijesha Police Station where he was told to pay N50,000 to bail the laptop. When 
Okoroafor’s father attempted to challenge them, the policemen assaulted Okoroafor and 
told him that the reason they did so was because his father wanted to show them that 
“he has sense,” a Nigerian colloquialism for attempting to claim his rights. Okoroafor 
spent over two weeks in police detention before he was brought to court and charged 
with stealing and obtaining by false pretences. At the time this report was written, 
Okoroafor was being held in pretrial custody.
Like the extortion of money from suspects and detainees, the NPF’s practice of 
detaining private property and levying bail for it is unlawful in Nigeria. The Nigerian 
Court of Appeal has pointed out that there is:
  [N]o law which empowers the Police to detain a motor vehicle in such circumstances, particu-
larly, when it was not alleged that the vehicle had been used for the purpose of committing a 
crime—on the contrary, the vehicle in this case was the victim of alleged criminal acts by the 
defendant. In my view, it was always open to the respondent (victim) to have applied to the 
Police for the release of the motor-cycle, even before the criminal trial, upon an understand-
ing to produce the motor-cycle as well as the replace damaged parts, if required in evidence 
at the trial. To have failed to do that was to have failed in his duty to mitigate his damages as 
required by law.293
Easing the Passage: Police Extortion on Public 
Highways
Field monitors discovered that police personnel set out daily in every state, often in 
groups, to extort money from commercial transport operators and even passersby. Most 
affected are commercial motorists who are made to pay between N20 and N200—
depending on the nature and size of the vehicle—merely to cross police checkpoints. 
It is immaterial that they have committed no offense and that their vehicle is in good 
condition. The main victims of such extortion are users of commercial vehicles and 
their drivers. The mechanics are quite simple:
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  A majority of motorists will have one thing or the other wrong with their papers. For such 
lapses, the Policemen intimidate the drivers to part with sums of money as small as N50 or 
as big as N300. Every commercial motorcyclist must give them N20. It is extortion as they 
never manage to take the matter further than wasting people’s time if they refuse to pay.294 
Motorists who refuse to pay are either delayed for hours or taken to the station 
where they are liable to face trumped up charges ranging from dangerous driving to 
receiving stolen goods or even armed robbery. This pattern of monetary extortion, for 
example, was found by researchers in over 40 police stations in Oyo State alone. Pas-
sengers and road users in Kaduna testify to the exploits of a police officer known as 
“Dogo” (“the tall one” in Hausa) who operates along the Kano-Kabala Road and who 
usually leads teams of police to harass and intimidate commercial drivers. According 
to Kola, a commercial driver in Kaduna Metropolis, “for any commercial driver passing 
through this route the fear of ‘Dogo’ is the beginning of wisdom.”295
Your Money or Your ...  
Sometimes, what begins as extortion easily transforms into other crimes, including 
theft, torture, and even extrajudicial execution. In one such instance, Bitrus Nda, a local 
councilor in Jos, Plateau State, was on his motorcycle in the city in February 2007 when 
he was stopped by Corporal Musa and Constable Jonathan of the Police Mobile Force. 
The police officers requested that he produce the registration and other documentation 
for the motorbike. Councilor Bitrus claimed that he did not have the documents with 
him but promptly sent someone to fetch them from his home, which was not far away. 
The police officers clearly told him that they wanted money and were not interested in 
his documents. Councilor Bitrus pointedly told the officers that they had no right to 
demand bribes from him. They responded by assaulting Bitrus, fracturing his clavicle. 
Councilor Bitrus told researchers that while the officers beat him, they shouted at him, 
telling him that he could not complain to anyone because “even the IGP collects bribes.” 
In another example relayed to NOPRIN researchers, Mallam Ahmed Abubakar, 
a security staff member of the Industrial Training Fund in Jos, was stopped by a traffic 
warden on the morning of July 19, 2005, while riding his Vespa motorscooter along Yan-
Taya Junction in Jos town. The traffic warden alleged that the vehicle registration num-
ber on the scooter was foreign and insisted on taking the Vespa to the police station. 
Abubakar asked to be allowed to remove the N150,000 that was in the compartment of 
the Vespa before it was taken away. The traffic warden refused, telling Abubakar that 
he was attempting to tamper with a “confiscated exhibit.” He was only then informed 
that the Vespa was suspected of being stolen. 
The traffic warden rode the motorscooter to the C Division in Jos, while Abubakar 
hurried to the Terminus Police Station to lodge a complaint. He was advised to head for 
the C Division. On reaching the station, he accosted the traffic warden and some other 
police officers standing by his Vespa. He explained to them what happened and added 
that he had money in the Vespa. The police led him to the Vespa and directed him to 
pick up his belongings. The money was missing. He was then told he was under arrest. 
When Abubakar demanded to know the reason for his arrest, the police severely beat 
him, dragged him by his feet and threw him into the cell where he was detained for 
about three hours before being removed to the Industrial Training Fund Hospital for 
treatment. The police only agreed to have Abubakar removed to the hospital after he 
started vomiting blood. After being discharged from the hospital, Abubakar recovered 
his Vespa but was unable to recover even a fraction of the money.
In other cases, attempts at extortion lead to accidental deaths or even extrajudicial 
execution. In February 2006, a police officer in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, killed one 
of his colleagues and injured two others in an alleged “accidental discharge” following 
the outbreak of a dispute with a driver “who proved uncooperative with regard to the 
N20 toll gate fee.”296 In November 2007, 15-year-old Daniel Offiali was killed during a 
confrontation between a bus driver and a police officer seeking a bribe from the driver. 
According to a media account, Offiali “was reportedly felled by the Policeman’s bullet 
after the diver of a commercial vehicle he boarded disagreed with the Policeman over 
N20.”297 In July 2006, 22-year-old Nkechi Obidigwe of Isuofia, Aguata, Anambra State, 
was standing at a bus stop on her way home from computer training school when she 
was hit in the thigh by a bullet. A member of a team of police officers on an illegal 
operation at the scene had fired the bullet while in the process of extracting N20 from 
a commercial motorbike operator who had declined to pay. The police attempted to 
confiscate his bike, at which point a scuffle ensued. One of the police officers then 
threatened to shoot the bike operator. In the course of the ensuing confusion, one 
of the officers fired a shot—apparently to scare the bike operator—but the bullet hit 
Obidigwe. Bystanders rushed Obidigwe to the nearby White Chapel Hospital where 
she died shortly afterwards. The police fled the scene, and no officer has been found 
responsible.298 
Medical Extortion and “One Chance”
In Onitsha, Anambra State, and Ibadan, Oyo State, many people who spoke to NOPRIN 
researchers reported what is known as “medical extortion.” One form of this practice 
involves requiring the families of tortured detainees to pay money to the police in order 
to allow the victims to receive medical attention. Families of victims of extrajudicial 
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executions are also often made to pay for the privilege of removing the bodies of their 
family members for burial. For instance, researchers were told of Eke Nwose’s father 
who paid N11,000 for this purpose to men of the SCID in Pant i, Lagos, but never got 
to retrieve his son’s body.
Many interviewees in southern Nigeria reported a form of police extortion—popu-
larly known as “one chance”—associated with the rush-hour commute in urban areas. 
According to interviews, NPF officers of the Agugu and Mapo Police Stations in Ibadan, 
Oyo State, and different police formations in Lagos are infamous for this technique. 
The police drive through urban areas in umarked buses and pick up passengers just as 
normal commuter buses do. Passengers enter the buses in the belief that the buses will 
take them to their destinations, only to have the buses drive to the police station, where 
the passengers are informed that they have been arrested for “wandering.”299 They are 
then advised to contact their families to arrange for the payment of “fines,” which can 
range from N500 to N2,000,  depending on the status of each “wanderer.”
Reports of police extortion often cite a variety of police-for-hire or protection rack-
ets. For instance, interviewees reported that police usually levy what is called the “police 
station fine” on families of both complainants and detainees. The complainants are 
required to pay the fines as incentive to the police to direct attention to the suspects or 
accused. The latter is in turn required to pay a fine in order to arrange bail, secure favor-
able treatment from the police, or obtain a bit of cell space while in detention. Detainees 
who do not or cannot pay receive a rougher time in detention that those who can and 
do. Sani Abdullahi, a commercial motorbike operator arrested and detained overnight 
at the No-man’s Land Police Station in Kano on February 3, 2007, narrated to NOPRIN 
researchers how he was “thoroughly beaten by the people we met in the cell” because 
he did not have money on him to pay for space. He was released the following morning 
after his brother paid N1,000 to the police. 
“Percentage” Policing: Collecting Debts for Commission 
All complainants who go to the police with allegations of theft of money or debt know 
that they will have to surrender a significant percentage of any funds recovered by the 
police. Court cases have shown that officers of the NPF seem to deliberately blur the 
clear distinction between civil debt (which is not a crime) and theft (which is); deploying 
themselves enthusiastically to recover debts or lost property and unilaterally determining 
what percentage of the recovered resources they will retain as commission for their effort. 
In 2003, the Nigerian Court of Appeal acknowledged that it had become “fashion-
able for legal counsel instructed to recover debts and rents to resort to use of members 
of the armed forces, particularly the Police.”300 Yet, it is clear under Nigerian law that the 
police are not a debt collection agency and police officers have no power to collect civil 
debt. Nigerian courts have repeatedly affirmed and clarified this position. As declared 
by the Court of Appeal in a 2004 judgment that “the duty of the Police is enumerated 
in the Police Act and it does not include debt collection.”301
In Ken MacLaren v. James Lloyd Jenning, Jenning, a businessman, sued MacLaren 
and two police officers in Kano State for unlawful arrest and imprisonment. Jenning 
was the managing director of a company which owed money to MacLaren. To collect the 
debt, MacLaren hired two police officers who abducted Jenning and, in a car provided 
by MacLaren, drove him to Abuja—a road journey of about five hours—where they 
detained him overnight in a suite at the five-star Nicon Hilton Hotel and repeatedly 
threatened him with severe consequences, including prolonged detention, if he failed 
to pay the debt. The police did not at any time allege that Jenning was suspected of a 
crime. The Court of Appeal held: 
  I ... am unable to see a provision providing for or empowering Police to enforce contract or 
collect common debts. The Appellants and the Police men they took to Kano were there to 
collect debt which is not one of the several duties assigned to the Police under the provisions 
of the Police Act to which the court was directed and the Court has not been able to find 
another provision of the Act empowering or constituting the Nigeria Police Force to one of 
a debt collector.302
Notwithstanding this clear legal prohibition, researchers found that personnel 
of the NPF are routinely involved in percentage or commission policing, where the 
police are used for various kinds of debt recovery or other non-crime-related transac-
tions in return for a percentage of the sums involved. For example, sometime in June 
2005, Linus Eluboh complained to the police at Area E, FESTAC Town, Lagos that he 
caught a male neighbor, one Ugochukwu Onwukwe, making love to his wife. Adultery 
is not a crime in Lagos. According to Eluboh, he had long suspected the existence of 
an amorous relationship between his wife and Onwukwe, and one day caught them in 
flagrante delicto. Eluboh reported this to the police who promptly arrested Onwukwe for 
an unknown crime. At the station, Eluboh requested for N100,000 from Onwukwe’s 
parents to enable him travel to their hometown for “ritual cleansing” according to their 
custom. The police insisted that Onwukwe would not be granted bail (for this nonex-
istent crime) unless his parents provided the money. When this money was paid, the 
police retained N30,000, claiming that it was for the work they did for Eluboh.
Other examples were relayed to this report’s researchers. In February 2007, 
Elochukwu Umeobi, a motorcycle dealer in Ebutte Metta, Lagos, reported to the SCID 
in Panti, Yaba, that Paul Nweke owed him N375, 000. Although civil debt is not a crime 
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in Nigeria, the police arrested and detained Nweke for four days, only releasing him 
after he agreed to pay the debt in two installments, the first on March 2, 2007, and the 
final one two months later. Nweke paid the sum of N200,000 to the police on March 
2, 2007. When Umeobi went to the police to collect the money on March 7, 2007, they 
reportedly told him that they had taken N40,000 out of the money for their assistance 
to him in the debt’s recovery. 
Similarly, in January 2007, Theresa Ogbodo complained at the Area C Police Sta-
tion in Surulere, Lagos, that one of her domestic staff had stolen the sum of US $1,000, 
which she was given during a trip to the United States. The police traced the domestic 
and recovered part of the money on the worker. When the complainant returned to the 
police station to collect the money, the police informed her that they were retaining 10 
percent of the amount recovered.
X. Impunity and Failure of 
 Accountability
Despite the many crimes committed by police, and the attention of two presidential 
commissions, NPF personnel enjoy impunity for their criminal acts. Factors both within 
and outside the NPF work against accountability for police crimes. Within the NPF, 
the same factors that make the police ineffectual in crime detection and control also 
inhibit the investigation and punishment of police abuses. Where police abuse rises to 
the level of a crime, the police remain the primary investigating agency—and as this 
report has demonstrated, the NPF does not excel at conducting criminal investigations. 
In addition, the NPF’s monolithic management structure is not conducive to effective 
internal controls. 
Under the constitution, the police are controlled by the president and where police 
abuse occurs in service of the interests of the president, his political party, or his associ-
ates, there is no incentive to ensure accountability. The jurisdiction of the Police Service 
Commission (PSC), which has oversight and disciplinary powers over the police, does 
not extend to the conduct of the president or the inspector-general of police, who exer-
cise supreme operational control over the NPF. Even where the PSC does have jurisdic-
tion, the police have been notoriously unwilling to cooperate with it.303 
In 2004, Nigeria’s Legal Defense and Assistance Project reported 2,987 cases 
of extrajudicial executions by police; in not one of these cases was there a conviction. 
On the rare occasions when police crimes are brought to court, the prosecutions are 
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usually unsuccessful. The very factors that hinder the NPF’s ability to solve ordinary 
crime—lack of investigative capacity, poor record-keeping, failure to gather evidence—
also hinder its ability to respond to crime committed by police.
Even where the authorities are willing and able to bring charges against the police, 
the judiciary often sides with the NPF. In Eze Ibe v. the State of Nigeria a police officer 
was charged with killing two brothers. The evidence established that the officer first 
shot one brother through the back and then shot the other after the latter sought to rally 
the public to hold the officer accountable. Thereafter, the officer started waving his gun 
from side to side in a threatening manner to scare the crowd out of taking action against 
him. Nigeria’s Supreme Court acquitted him of homicide, saying that “this is a case of 
accidental discharge of the appellant’s gun when he was physically being attacked to 
seize his gun from him rather than a deliberate act to shoot.”304
In December 2006, the Supreme Court acquitted a police officer, Sunday Udosen, 
of the murder of Eunice Ikezuagu. Udosen was charged with shooting and fatally 
wounding Ikezuagu along the Enugu-Okigwe Road in southeastern Nigeria when the 
Volkswagen Jetta in which she was traveling failed to stop or heed his demand for mon-
etary extortion. After shooting Ikezuagu, Udosen reported that he had shot an armed 
robber. In acquitting Udosen, the Supreme Court held that: 
  there were two irreconcilable versions of how the deceased met her death ... the evidence on 
record was that he fired at the Jetta car intending to disable it from escaping. Further, there 
was no evidence that the appellant had intended to cause grievous harm to anybody and had 
in the process mistakenly killed the deceased.305
Noteworthy for its rarity is the Supreme Court’s December 2006 ruling that 
affirmed the murder conviction of a police sergeant, Adegboye Ibikunle, for the unlaw-
ful killing of Godspower Edeha. As in most cases of police killing, Sergeant Ibikunle 
branded the victim an armed robber after shooting him.306 Sergeant Ibikunle’s convic-
tion only highlights the hundreds of police killings that go unpunished in Nigeria every 
year.
Although the crime of torture does not exist in Nigerian law, the Criminal Code 
includes such offenses against the person as assault, rape, and murder.307 The ineffec-
tiveness of judicial oversight of the NPF is reflected in the failure of judges to exclude 
confessional evidence procured by torture or coercion. In those cases where the courts 
have found the NPF liable for constitutionally prohibited torture, they have failed to 
order the investigation and prosecution of the officers involved or implicated. 
The case of the officers who summarily executed six youths in Apo Village, Abuja, 
in 2005 illustrates the difficulties with ensuring accountability for police abuses. The 
Justice Goodluck Commission recommended the prosecution of all of the officers 
involved in the killings. In its Universal Periodic Review report to the United Nations 
Human Rights Council in 2009, Nigeria’s federal government claimed that the officers 
implicated had been tried and sentenced to death.308 No such thing had happened. On 
the contrary, of the senior police officers who participated in the killing, one inexplicably 
escaped while in police custody.309 Two others subsequently secured bail on specious 
grounds, and despite Nigerian law’s prohibition on bail in murder cases.310 The main 
witness in the case, Police Constable Anthony Idam, “lost his life in the attempt [by the 
culprits] to cover up the true situation.”311 There has been little progress since. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the public regards the NPF as lacking the credibility to inves-
tigate crimes committed by police. Nor is it surprising that most victims, fearing intimi-
dation or reprisal by the police, are afraid to report or seek accountability for abuses. 
Given this situation, few complainants have the will to report violations by the 
police. Victims of police abuse are mostly poor people who cannot afford legal repre-
sentation. In particular, those victims who suffer abuse as detainees are often denied 
access to family, friends, or legal representation in the critical period between arrest and 
arraignment. The Legal Aid Council established by the federal government to provide 
official access to legal assistance is grossly under funded. State governments—which 
have the responsibility and power to prosecute most offenses by the police—are unable 
to exercise any leverage over them. To achieve some coordination between state and 
federal criminal justice agencies, the federal government in 1999 established Admin-
istration of Justice Committees under the leadership of the chief justice of Nigeria at 
the federal level, and the state chief judges at the state levels, to coordinate and monitor 
the several agencies of the criminal justice system including the police, courts, prisons, 
and legal aid. At the time of this report, these committees were non-functional across 
the country. 
Uncooperative Police, Moribund Institutions, and 
Unavailable Records
The NPF habitually disregards any attempted oversight of the police, including judicial 
processes and orders. Few people have the courage to serve processes on the police and 
those who try are sometimes severely abused themselves. In February 2006, Human 
Rights Monitor, an NGO in Jos, Plateau State, reported the case of Henry Longs, a 
lawyer whose client, a 14-year-old girl, had been arrested, detained, and assaulted by 
police officers who had unsuccessfully attempted to arrest her father. On behalf of 
the 14-year-old, Longs instituted legal proceedings before the High Court in Pankshin, 
Plateau State, which issued an order for the release of the victim. Accompanied by the 
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court bailiff, Longs visited the police station to serve the order on Superintendent of 
Police Uche Ebere:
  Surprisingly, instead of the Police officer to accept and respect the court order, he and some 
of his men physically assaulted the bailiff and when Barrister Henry tried to query their 
action, the Police officer personally assaulted him and ordered that he be detained ... He was, 
however, said to have been released 30 minutes later.312
In another case in Enugu, in December 2008 the officer in charge of the state 
SARS arrested and detained a lawyer who was representing several victims of alleged 
police torture and extrajudicial execution. 
When served with legal papers, the police often disregard the proceedings or fail 
to enter any appearance or defense. In 2005, Alloysius and Chinyere Maduka, hus-
band and wife, were arrested and detained for three and eleven days respectively by 
police in Benin-City, Edo State, without charge. During his detention, Maduka suffered 
abuse from three police officers who beat him and vandalized his Mercedes Benz car. 
The couple sued the three police officers who were responsible for these violations. In 
October 2006, the Federal High Court in Benin City entered judgment for on behalf of 
the Madukas, awarding them N12 million in damages. The police officers were never 
represented at the trial.313 
Although the NPF is a federal institution, responsibility for ensuring accountabil-
ity for offenses against the person rests with state governments. The states’ coroners’ 
laws are a major element in the legal infrastructure of accountability for crimes against 
the person, especially in cases involving extrajudicial executions.314 A coroner, who is 
usually a magistrate, is to undertake an inquest “whenever there is a reasonable cause to 
suspect that the cause of death is unknown; the death is sudden, unexpected or unnatu-
ral; violent or suspicious; due to a medical intervention, negligence or misconduct, or 
from a known or unknown cause while a person is in custody of any type.”315 
Coroners’ laws, which exist in all states of Nigeria, have, for the most part, become 
moribund.316 In Lagos State, where the state government has made a commitment to 
revitalize the coroners’ jurisdiction, the police do not appear prepared to cooperate. For 
instance, although the police were duly served and summoned in an inquest in Yaba, 
Lagos, into the police killing in January 2002 of two transport workers, “they made only 
one appearance at the inquest.”317 Thus, in practice few inquests take place, and those 
that do are not worth the name because witnesses refuse to appear. The police do not 
even keep records of such inquests. In most cases, the police merely procure a magis-
trate to fill out and sign the statutory forms as if a coroner’s inquiry had taken place. 
Thus in some parts of Nigeria, coroners are called “police magistrates.” Asked in 2005 
by the UN Special Rapporteur for statistics on inquests, the inspector-general of police 
responded rather laconically: “Coronial [sic] inquiries are been [sic] conducted in all 
relevant cases, however, records are not available as at the time of this compilation.”318
The police appear to prefer internal control measures to external oversight. In 
response to a question from UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston in July 2005, concern-
ing disciplinary and accountability procedures within the NPF, then Inspector-General 
of Police Sunday Ehindero answered: 
  Whenever complaints of professional misconduct is [sic] established against a Police Officer, 
he is subjected to internal inquiry with a view to ascertaining the degree of his misconduct, 
consequence [sic] upon which he will be disciplined by the appropriate authority.319
This response notably fails to provide any quantitative or qualitative information 
that could be used to determine the credibility of the internal disciplinary procedures 
of the police—no details of the procedures the police have for receiving or processing 
complaints, the average duration of the complaints, any mechanisms for ensuring that 
complainants and victims receive fair opportunities to put their complaints before the 
inquiries, liaison with victims, or guarantees against intimidation and harassment of 
complainants. The ultimate internal control mechanism of the police is an Orderly Room 
Trial, the police equivalent of a court martial. The public does not participate in these 
internal police proceedings nor do the police produce any public report of these trials. 
TABLE 5:
Disciplinary Measures Instituted by the NPF, 2000–2004320
No. Disciplinary Measures 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
1 Interdiction of Senior Officers 6 1 14 5 — 26
2 Suspension of Senior Officers 9 2 6 — — 17
3 Interdiction of Inspectors 2 1 31 — — 34
4 Suspension of Inspectors 6 12 6 — 6 30
5 Interdiction of Rank & File 
(Constable-Inspectors)
— 11 — — — 11
6 Suspension of Rank & File 7 4 63 — — 74
7 Dismissal 193 151 454 467 844 2,109
8 Reduction in Rank 121 106 189 227 544 1,187
9 Major Entries 422 446 598 870 1,557 3,893
10 Minor Entries 76 162 247 237 494 1,216
11 Reprimand 41 100 109 93 305 648
12 Discharged and Acquitted 55 47 71 39 50 262
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It is evident from these figures that the police use the instruments of suspension 
or interdiction of officers rather sparingly in comparison to the number of officers 
who are dismissed. This implies that officers with pending complaints—complaints 
serious enough to merit the officers’ eventual dismissal from the force—are not being 
interdicted or suspended while the complaints against them are investigated. Instead, 
officers with serious complaints against them are allowed to remain in the force, with 
the ability to intimidate and harass the victims from pursuing redress. This practice 
hampers effective internal control and external oversight.
The Nigeria Police Force: A Pattern of Stalling and 
Indifference
Rather than suspend them or assign them to desk duty, the management of the NPF 
usually transfers police officers involved in cases of serious or reported violations. Faced 
with the resulting inability to locate the affected police officers in the system, the inves-
tigating agencies often give up on complaints. In a report of an investigation into police 
abuses published in October 2008, the Punch newspaper concluded that “[i]n most 
cases, police authorities shield errant policemen from the law by posting them to other 
beats or other states. Aggrieved relations are either cowed or given paltry sums in lieu 
of their dead relations.”321 
As a result, organizational as well as individual accountability suffers greatly. For 
example, following the attack by men of the NPF on the Ogaminana community, Kogi 
State, in February 2008, which resulted in the deaths of over fifteen people and the 
displacement of over 5,000 more, the commander who managed the operation, Assis-
tant Commissioner of Police Jonathan Udoh, was immediately transferred out of the 
state. With the transfer of Udoh, a vital source of knowledge and evidence about what 
transpired was removed from the location. The new area commander is understand-
ably unable to account for what happened before the commencement of his command 
while the person with the knowledge is not available because he now works elsewhere. 
In all but five of the 254 complaints of extrajudicial execution lodged with the 
National Human Rights Commission since 1997, the complaints stalled in the face of a 
pattern of failure or refusal by the police to acknowledge the entreaties of the commis-
sion, unverified claims that they were investigating, or repeated transfer of the officers 
against whom the complaints were made. Almost invariably the complaints ground to 
a halt in the face of the NPF’s obvious lack of cooperation.  
For instance, in petition no. C/97/22 one Usman Dawuda Kutigi allegedly died 
in the custody of Malali Divisional Police Headquarters, Kaduna, while under deten-
tion on suspicion of involvement in the theft of his own a portable electric generator. 
On the inquiry of the commission, the police claimed that Kutigi became ill while in 
custody and was taken to the hospital where he died. Hospital records showed that the 
police deposited his corpse in the hospital. The commission’s effort to ensure that the 
police involved were held accountable failed because the NPF transferred the suspected 
culprits to other duty posts and declined to provide any forwarding addresses for them. 
Petition C/97/031 describes two detainees who died during their third month of 
detention in the Adeniji-Adele Police Station, Lagos. The police similarly claimed here 
that the victims became ill and were taken to the hospital where they died. The Lagos 
General Hospital report, ho wever, showed that when the detainees were brought to the 
hospital there were already deceased. Four years after the complaint was filed, the com-
mission abandoned the case because the IGP continued to claim without verification 
that the police were still investigating the case.322 
The Police Service Commission: “Dismal and 
Self-restraining”
The Police Service Commission, established in 2001 as the oversight body for the police, 
has nominally strong statutory powers but remains institutionally enfeebled.323 The UN 
Special Rapporteur sums up the record of the commission in the report of his mission 
to Nigeria as follows: 
  The Police Service Commission is charged with police discipline, but has opted to refer all 
complaints of extrajudicial police killings back to the police for investigation. The Com-
mission’s mandate is potentially empowering. But despite efforts by one or two excellent 
commissioners, its performance has been dismal and self-restraining. Its quarterly reports 
to the President are not published and present a dismal chronicle of rubber-stamping deci-
sions taken by the police, coupled with inaction in relation to pressing concerns. A radical 
overhaul of its procedures and composition is warranted.324 
The tenure of the PSC’s first council lapsed in November 2006. In the absence 
of the council, the PSC was unable to consider or take any decisions on complaints of 
police abuse. In April 2008, the federal government inaugurated a new council for the 
PSC headed by retired Deputy Inspector-General of Police Parry Osayande. The leader-
ship of the PSC convened surreptitiously in December 2008, after some of the mem-
bers had already proceeded on end of year holidays, to adopt an internal police report 
recommending the sacking from the NPF of Nuhu Ribadu, former head of Nigeria’s 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, who had fallen out of favor with the 
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government for appearing too committed to rooting out corruption in public life in 
Nigeria. The IGP happened to be the complainant in the case.325 
The attitude of the NPF’s leadership toward the PSC reflects a mixture of indif-
ference, resistance, reluctant acknowledgement, and co-optation. Better resourced than 
the PSC, the leadership of the police has reportedly sought to limit the role of the PSC, 
declined to cooperate with it and, notwithstanding clear statutory provisions to the 
contrary, vigorously contest the standing of the commission to investigate police mis-
conduct. In February 2006, the Federal High Court in Abuja ruled that the PSC was 
precluded from undertaking its statutory functions wherever a disciplinary infraction 
involving the commission of crime is alleged against a police officer because, “wherever 
crimes are alleged and investigation is required, the duty to carry out such an investiga-
tion is that of the Nigeria Police Force, which is trained to carry out such a function.”326 
Underlying this decision is the suggestion that the NPF enjoys a monopoly of powers 
of criminal investigation. This suggestion is unfounded in both the law and the insti-
tutional architecture of internal security agencies in Nigeria. The power to investigate 
crimes is dispersed among several federal agencies of which the NPF is only one. More-
over, this decision erroneously erases the essential distinction between criminal and 
administrative proceedings and, if it were to reflect the law, would preclude disciplinary 
action against any police officers in all but the most minor and irrelevant of cases where 
there is no crime involved. 
XI. Conclusion
The preparation of this report took place while Nigeria experienced a constitutional cri-
sis brought on by the deteriorating health of the late President Umaru Yar’Adua. During 
this crisis, it appears that police conduct has worsened. NPF personnel were accused of 
opening fire on a group of youths protesting police brutality in April 2010.327 Asked to 
help control sectarian violence instigated by members of the Boko-Haram sect in Borno 
State in July 2009, the NPF extrajudicially executed hundreds of suspected members of 
the sect, including its leader, even after sect members had surrendered.328 In April 2008, 
a High Court on Borno State found the NPF guilty of “brutal” and unlawful conduct in 
this case and awarded substantial damages against it.329
In 2008 in Ogun State, police killed Waliyu Abudu, then publicly claimed the 
mother and poultry farm worker was actually the leader of an armed robbery gang. In 
Abuja, Lawal Yahuza was forced to crawl into court for his 2004 trial, after his ankles 
were broken by the police torturing him. In Lagos State in 2007, police picked up a 
14-year-old girl out buying bread for her family and raped her. In 2006 in Anambra 
State, Nkechi Obidigwe was killed by a stray bullet fired by a police officer seeking a 
bribe from a commercial motorbike operator.
Every day, in all corners of the country, police in Nigeria commit murder, torture, 
rape, and extortion. These crimes are so common, so numerous, and so widespread that 
it is impossible to fully document all of them. The goal of this report, then, is not to 
enumerate every major crime committed by a member of the NPF, but rather to provide 
examples that convey the scope and complexity of the problem, and to push for solutions.
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The conduct and operations of the Nigeria Police Force bear almost no resem-
blance to the requirements of Nigerian law. Far from protecting human life, safety, and 
security, the NPF increasingly endangers them. Urgent measures are required to return 
policing in Nigeria to the path of lawfulness, respectability, and public confidence. 
Currently, there is virtually no accountability for police crimes. The NPF is con-
trolled at the federal level and its officers are not answerable to the local populations 
they police. The NPF is responsible for investigating crimes committed by its personnel, 
but has neither the ability nor the inclination to do so. The Police Service Commission, 
the government body designed to oversee the police, is hopelessly weak.
When the acting inspector-general of police can boast that his men killed 785 
people in just 100 days—and receive a promotion for his work—clearly, something 
must change. When even the most notorious case of extrajudicial killings by police—the 
infamous Apo Six murders—results in not a single conviction, reform is needed. It is 
more critical now than ever for Nigeria’s federal government, National Assembly, Police 
Service Commission, and international partners to work with the NPF to reduce crime 
by its personnel and prosecute it when it occurs. Until that happens, Nigerians will 
continue to suffer from crimes committed by the very people sworn to keep them safe.
Nigeria’s new president must confront the challenges posed by the police force 
described in this report. In the inaugural address following his swearing in on May 
6, 2010, the new president, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, insisted that “the security of life 
and property around the entire country would be of top-most priority in the remaining 
period of this administration.”330 To achieve this, he must begin by according priority 
to a comprehensive reform of the Nigeria Police Force.
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TABLE A2:
Complaints to the National Human Rights Commission Regarding Extrajudicial Killings 
by Law Enforcement Agencies, 1997–2005
1997
Complaint No. No. of Victims Alleged Violator Nature of Death Location
022 1 Police Died in custody KADUNA
031 2 Police Died in custody BAYELSA
033 1 Police Shot BORNO
055 1 Army Beating OYO
061 1 Police Beating CRS
098 1 Police Died in custody FCT
Total 7
1998
Complaint No. No. of Victims Alleged Violator Nature of Death Location
011 1 Police Shot LAGOS
031 1 Police Shot LAGOS
037 1 Police Shot CRS
051 1 Police Beating RIVERS
075 2 Police Shot FCT
106 6 Police Shot DELTA
107 1 Police Shot OYO
162 4 Police Shot KADUNA
212 4 Army Shot KADUNA
Total 21
1999
Complaint No. No. of Victims Alleged Violator Nature of Death Location
039 1 Police Shot LAGOS
083 1 Police Shot IMO
103 1 Police/SSS Shot PLATEAU
205 1 Police Shot PLATEAU
233 2 Police Tortured/Shot KANO
268 1 Police Shot BORNO
272 1 Police Shot OYO
299 3 Police/Army Shot RIVERS
310 1 Police Disappeared FCT
327 1 NDLEA Shot DELTA
332 2 Police Shot RIVERS
Total 15
C R I M I N A L  F O R C E   1 0 5
1 0 6   A P P E N D I X
2000
Complaint No. No. of Victims Alleged Violator Nature of Death Location
069 1 Police Died in custody FCT
149 3 Police/Army Shot IMO
150 23 Police Shot (protesters) YOBE
163 1 Police Shot FCT
190 1 Police Shot NASARAWA
202 1 Police Shot KATSINA
221 1 Police Shot A/IBOM
233 1 Police Shot A/IBOM
248 1 Police Shot DELTA
255 2 Police Shot ENUGU
333 5 Police Shot NIGER
351 1 Police Shot ABIA
354 1 Police Died in custody DELTA
440 1 Army Shot FCT
475 1 Police Shot KATSINA
495 1 Police Shot LAGOS
539 1 Police Shot CRS
Total 46
2001
Complaint No. No. of Victims Alleged Violator Nature of Death Location
043 9 Police Shot NASARAWA
060 7 Police Shot BENUE
094 1 Police Shot ANAMBRA
133 1 Police Shot ANAMBRA
135 1 Police Shot KADUNA
165 1 Police Died in custody RIVERS
171 2 Police Died in custody RIVERS
232 1 Police Disappeared ABIA
302 7 Police Shot A/IBOM
325 3 Police Shot LAGOS
352 3 Police Shot IMO
369 1 Navy Shot RIVERS
373 1 Police Shot EKITI
390 20 (Odi) Army Shot BAYELSA
406 1 Army Shot BAYELSA
473 2 Police Shot BORNO
514 1 Police Shot FCT
531 1 Police Died in custody BORNO
Total 63
C R I M I N A L  F O R C E   1 0 7
1 0 8   A P P E N D I X
2002
Complaint No. No. of Victims Alleged Violator Nature of Death Location
034 1 Police Shot LAGOS
077 1 Police Shot LAGOS
123 2 Police Shot ANAMBRA
129 2 Police Shot ENUGU
130 26 Police Shot ENUGU
146 1 Police Shot ENUGU
152 2 Police Shot ENUGU
154 1 Police Shot RIVERS
253 1 Police Died in custody CRS
419 1 Police Shot FCT
421 2 Police/Bakasi Macheted ANAMBRA
Total 40
2003
Complaint No. No. of Victims Alleged Violator Nature of Death Location
033 1 Police Shot EBONYI
047 1 Police Shot KADUNA
166 1 Police Shot FCT
260 1 Police Shot RIVERS
286 25 Police Shot NIGER
310 10 Police Shot FCT
338 3 Police Shot RIVERS
341 3 Police Shot ONDO
370 1 Police Shot ANAMBRA
417 1 Army Shot FCT
430 1 Police Shot FCT
Total 48
2005
Complaint No. No. of Victims Alleged Violator Nature of Death Location
061 1 Air-force Shot CRS
062 1 Police Shot FCT
096 1 Police Shot KEBBI
105 1 Police Shot ENUGU
124 1 Police Shot IMO
138 3 Army Shot TARABA
223 1 Police Shot EDO
262 1 Police Shot FCT
263 1 Police Shot KADUNA
275 1 Police Shot IMO
365 1 Police Shot LAGOS
374 1 Police Shot ANAMBRA
Total 14
Summary
Year Totals
1996 0
1997 7
1998 21
1999 15
2000 46
2001 63
2002 40
2003 48
2004 00
2005 14
Grand Total 254
  1 0 9
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3. This power is granted to the PSC under Section 6 of the Police Service Commission (Estab-
lishment) Act 2001.
4. Yusuf Committee Report, p. 30.
5. Ibid., p. 21.
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Personnel of the Nigeria Police Force routinely carry out summary 
executions of persons accused or suspected of armed robbery and 
other offenses, rely on torture as a principal means of investigation, 
and maintain designated torture chambers, instruments, and 
personnel in most police stations. Nigeria’s government has 
previously acknowledged this problem and promised to address it. 
The evidence in this report shows that far from doing so, police abuse 
has become quite entrenched and is now well accepted as perhaps 
the only tool of policing.  
Despite repeated confirmation of these patterns of police abuse 
by several investigations, including recent high level presidential 
commissions, the government fails to take effective measures to 
curb police abuses. In particular, Nigeria’s government has failed 
to institute or exercise due diligence in investigating or ensuring 
accountability for police abuses. Additionally, the police do not 
have effective or transparent mechanisms of internal control and 
discipline. The result is impunity.
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